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Lani Guinier*
The Supreme  Court's decision in Bush v.  GoreI ostensibly  protected
the  rights  of a single  political  candidate  to the  equal  protection  of the
laws. 2  It is consistent, in  that sense,  with other constitutional  law cases
that  focus  on  the  abstract  rights  of  individuals  to  something  called
"equality."  Yet,  Bush  v.  Gore has  secured  a  place  in  constitutional
jurisprudence  without regard to legal doctrines in general  or the doctrine
of equal protection  in particular.
Certainly,  its  long-term  significance  is  assured because  the  opinion
dramatically  resolved  a presidential  election.  Equally  significant is  the
Court's  appropriation  of the  language  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,
enacted after the Civil War to protect the newly freed slaves, to express
an  aristocratic,  albeit  inchoate,  political  philosophy:  that  hierarchy,
ratified  by the holding of elections,  equals  democracy.  Animated  by a
passion  for political  stability,  rather  than political  equality,  the justices
in the majority deployed the Equal Protection  Clause as a formal tool to
accomplish  a  goal  that  has  little  to  do  with  noble  ideas  of political
equality  and  much  to  do  with  an  elite-centered  political  orientation.
Indeed,  the  decision  limited,  rather  than  broadened,  the  concept  of
equality  as the Court sought to avoid  its greatest fear:  the nightmare of
too much democracy.
In  Bush  v.  Gore, the  majority  granted  to  a  single  candidate  with  a
privileged pedigree  rights  that  the Court  has  yet to accord  the  average
voter.  The  opinion  was  clear  on  this  distinction-the  protections
afforded  applied only  to George  W.  Bush  in this instance. 3  Moreover,
*  This  Essay  was  initially  delivered  as  an  oral  presentation  at  Loyola  University  Chicago
School of Law based on a chapter I  wrote  in the book,  A BADLY  FLAWED ELECTION:  DEBATING
BUSH  v.  GORE,  THE  SUPREME  COURT,  AND  AMERICAN  DEMOCRACY  (Ronald  Dworkin  ed.,
2002).  I have  tried to  retain the  informal style appropriate  to that venue,  and with permission  of
The New  Press, have  borrowed  liberally  from the  original chapter,  which was the  source of my
oral remarks.  Sam Spital,  Harvard  Law  School Class  of 2004, has  contributed excellent research
and editorial assistance.  His work has been invaluable to both these projects.
1.  Bush v.  Gore, 531  U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
2.  See id. at  Ill (per curiam).
3.  Id. at  109 (per curiam)  ("Our consideration  is limited  to the present  circumstances,  for the
problem of equal  protection  in election  processes generally  presents many complexities.").Loyola University  Chicago Law Journal
there was no comparable right for the voters.  As the Court reminded us,
there  is  no  constitutional  right  to  vote.4   Perceiving  its  role  as  the
guardian  of  what  Justice  O'Connor  termed  in  another  voting  case
"stability  and  measured  change," 5  the  Court  majority  vindicated  the
rights  of  a  powerful  individual.  Yet,  in  other  contexts,  the  same
majority has ignored the needs of the people as  a whole to exercise  their
power through equal  and meaningful participation  in political decisions
that shape their lives.
The implicit message of the Court's intervention  was  that democracy
is  a  domain  of  governing  elites,  not  robust  and  engaged  citizens.
Consistent  with  this  view,  Professor  Richard  Pildes  sees  increasing
evidence  that the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence, and not just its
decision  in  Bush  v.  Gore,  locates  the  center  of  gravity  in  our
political  system  in  unelected  federal  judges  rather  than  the  people
themselves. 6  As  Professor  Pildes  observes,  "Bush v.  Gore, for  all  its
uniqueness,  is  not  an  isolated  event.  It  is  best  understood,  instead,
as  the  most  dramatic  crystallization  of  a  deeper,  more  enduring
pattern  in  the  contemporary  relationship  between  democratic  politics
and  constitutional  law."7   Pildes  labels  this  phenomenon  "the
constitutionalization  of  democracy,"  meaning  that  theories  of
constitutional  law have played an increasingly  dominant role  in shaping
our  understanding  of  democracy. 8   Not  surprisingly,  such  a  view
asserts  a  central  role  for  judges,  whose  intervention  is  needed  to
protect the integrity of our political system from excessive  factionalism
and  political  chaos.  Professor  Pildes  has  uncovered  case  after case  in
which  the  majority  of  the  Court  sought  to  preserve  the  status  quo
despite  stunning  evidence  of  popular  disaffection  with  current
institutional arrangements. 9  Time and again, the measure of democracy
is its stability, not its flexibility;  the maintenance of order triumphs over
efforts to combat declining levels of citizen participation.
This  vision  of democracy  has two  key  consequences,  which  are the
focus  of  this  Essay.  First,  it  tolerates  inequalities  that  continue  to
disadvantage  historically  marginalized  members  of  the  polity,  whose
role  as  second-class  citizens  or three-fifths  of a person  is  part  of our
4.  Id. at 104 (per curiam).
5.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478  U.S.  109,  145 (1986)  (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6.  Richard Pildes,  Constitutionalizing  Democratic Politics, in A  BADLY  FLAWED  ELECTION:
DEBATING  BUSH  V. GORE,  THE  SUPREME  COURT,  AND  AMERICAN  DEMOCRACY  155  (Ronald
Dworkin ed., 2002) [hereinafter Pildes, Constitutionalizing  Democratic Politics].
7.  Id.
8.  Id.
9.  Id. at 161-76.
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governing  legacy.  Second,  it  ignores  the  declining  levels  of
participation  even  by  people  who  might  otherwise  identify  with  the
"official  portrait  of  the  United  States  as  the  standard  bearer  of
democracy and representative government."'
1 0
Both  of  these  troubling  phenomena  characterized  the  2000
presidential  election.  In Florida,  we  witnessed  the disenfranchisement
of people of color, elderly Jews,  and those who  had difficulty following
written  instructions.  Extremely  low  levels  of participation  across-the-
board  accompanied this  outright exclusion of many voters.  Indeed, one
of the most striking statistics about our political  system is how poorly  it
fosters  participation  in  democracy's  most  basic  act:  voting.  Of  the
172  countries  in  the  world  that  profess  to  be  democracies,  81%  have
higher  levels  of  voter  participation  than  the  United  States. II  Our
extraordinarily  low  turnout is  especially  disturbing  since  it is fueled  by
even  lower  rates  of  working-class  participation.  In  Europe,  the
difference  between  turnout  levels  among  the  affluent  and  low-income
voters  range  from 5%  to  10%. 12  In  the United  States,  more  than  two-
thirds  of  people  with  annual  incomes  greater  than  $50,000  vote,
compared with one-third of those with incomes under $10,000.13
Fewer  than  half  of  eligible  Americans  bother  to  vote  in  most
elections;  levels of turnout are  less than 30%  in off years. 14  For many,
declining to vote is a rational choice based on the fact that the two-party
duopoly  gerrymanders  districts  so  that  electoral  outcomes  are  usually
decided before  a single ballot is cast.  People of color, poor people,  and
women  remain  grossly  underrepresented  in  legislative  bodies  and
policy-making  influence.  Additionally,  money plays  an unprecedented
role  in  political  campaigns  and  supplies  wealthy  corporations,  interest
groups, and individuals with a disproportionate share of political power.
10.  ALEXANDER  KEYSSAR,  THE RIGHT TO VOTE 316-17  (2000).
11.  See  INST.  FOR  DEMOCRACY  &  ELECTORAL  ASSISTANCE,  VOTER  TURNOUT:  A  GLOBAL
SURVEY:  VOTER  TURNOUT  FROM  1945  TO  DATE:  A  GLOBAL  REPORT  ON  POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION,  at  http://www.idea.int/voter-turnout/voter-turnout2.html  (last  visited  Nov.  20,
2002).
12.  Lani  Guinier, What We Must Overcome, AM.  PROSPECT,  Mar. 12-26, 2001,  at 28.
13.  Id.
14.  See,  e.g.,  Derrick  Jackson,  Voting for Democracy, BOSTON  GLOBE,  Sept.  20,  2002,  at
A19, available at 2002  WL 4150053.  Jackson  said  "we still hate  voting"  a year after September
11.  Id.
Our turn outs,  sinking below  20 percent in the primaries  and rising  to only 50 percent
in presidential elections,  is nothing  compared with elections  elsewhere in the world  this
year.  Elections  in  Macedonia  brought  out  70  percent  of  the  voters.  Slovakia  is
anticipating  a  70 percent  turnout this weekend.  Lesotho, France,  and the Netherlands
had respective  turnouts of 68,  80, and 79 percent.
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Disaffection  with  our  current  political  system  manifests  itself  in
individual  isolation or withdrawal.  However, dissatisfaction can supply
the  impetus  for  social  movements  that  provide  an  outlet  for  political
commitments,  bring  citizens  together,  and  reverse  the  trend  toward
declining  turnout  levels.  Examples  include  the  flourishing  of  voter
initiatives  and the  burgeoning  of support  for third political  parties and
independent  candidates. 15   These  developments,  especially  those  that
inspire  interactive  experiments  in  community  organizing  and  political
involvement, have  a complex set of causes  and consequences, but on the
whole,  they  strike  me as positive  interventions  to be encouraged  rather
than  crushed.  Thus,  the  evidence  of  increasing  discontent  comes  in
divergent forms: apathy and alienation  on the one hand, citizen  activism
on  the  other.  Legal  rules  that enshrine  the existing  structure  promote
the former  and  risk suppressing  the  latter, with  potentially  devastating
consequences  for  our  democracy.  As  Judge  Damon  Keith  writes  in
regard  to  other  government  actions  that  attempt  to  leave  the  people
outside of the decision-making  process, "Democracies die behind closed
doors." 
16
Yet in the Court's constitutional  canon, democracy seems to function
best  when  decisions  are  made  behind  closed  doors  to  hold  ordinary
people  at bay.  Going out of its way  to protect the rights of the already
powerful,  the  Court  rejects  fusion  candidates,  ballot  access  for  third
parties,  or debates  that are  not limited  to the two  major parties and are
designed  to  address  some  of the  sources  of voter  disaffection. 17  The
Court  promotes  democracy  simply  as  the  act of holding  elections  that
function  as  a test  to narrow  the  electorate  to  those  who  are qualified,
i.e.,  those who  successfully  maneuver  through  the complex  machinery,
the  untrained  poll  workers,  and  the  inconvenient  polling  hours  to
actually  cast  a  vote.  Even if only  a few  people  manage  to  or care  to
vote,  they  are  the  ones  qualified  to  act  vicariously  for everyone  else.
The  few  can  act  and  the  many  are  simply  urged  to  place  their
confidence  in  traditions  based  on  hierarchy  and  privilege,  instead  of
relationships that build trust, share power, and spark innovation.
15.  After all,  many accuse  Ralph Nader of simply  losing the election for Al  Gore because  the
92,000 votes cast for Nader in Florida would have changed the close election into a decisive Gore
victory.  Sam Howe Verhovek, An  Unrepentant  Nader Unveils a New Grass-Roots Project,  N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001,  at A8, available  at LEXIS,  News Library, The New  York Times File.
16.  Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681,  683 (6th Cir. 2002).
17.  See  infra Part  III.B  (discussing  proportional  representation);  see  also Editorial,  Third
Thoughts, BOSTON  GLOBE, Sept. 30,  2002, at A18, available at 2002 WL 4151475  ("Inclusion  is
vitally important now, when  many people  are so turned off by politics that they don't even bother
to  vote....  Debate  organizers  who  limit  access  marginalize  third-party  supporters  and  risk
spreading voter apathy.").
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In  these  ways  the  Court's  interpretation  of legal  rules  helps  reduce
participation  to  an  existential  gesture,  limiting  the  role  of  ordinary
people  to  the act of casting a ballot that may  not count.18  Conveniently
enough,  this  interpretation  preempts  insurgent  social  movements  from
influencing  social  policy by circumscribing  opportunities  for citizens to
act  individually  or organize  collectively.  It  also constrains  the chance
for  democracy  itself  to  evolve.  And  it  assumes,  rather  than  earns,
democratic  legitimacy  as  it  encourages  blind  faith  in  a  "plutocracy"
of  "natural  leaders"  rather  than  reasoned,  contentious,  and  earnest
deliberation  among the  people themselves.  Government  by the  people
becomes government  by elites in  the name  of the people,  which assures
that alienation thrives while activism is discouraged.
And yet,  more  accessible  voting  opportunities  would only  salvage  a
small part of democracy's potential.  Although the act of voting can  be a
central  means  of  asserting  one's  connection  to  the  political  system,
democracy  is  not  simply  about  holding  open  elections  where  every
ballot counts.  Rather, it is a "diffuse  and urgent hope,"'19 that the people
themselves  can become moral  and  political actors  in the civic  fabric  of
our  society.  Indeed,  I  would  argue  that  we  need  democracy  in  our
everyday  lives  and  not  just  on  Election  Day.  We  should  consider
experimenting  with  even  more  participatory  forms  of self-government
that  foster organizing  and  collective  action  at the  local  level.  Unless
citizens  in  a  democracy  are  able  to  participate  over  time  in  a  public
process that permits them to speak for themselves, articulate their needs,
and  share  their  vision,  they  cannot  assume  moral  agency  in  public
policy debates  and will  never be equal partners in democratic  decision-
making.
In addition,  as Ian Shapiro notes,  "opposition  rights are important for
democratic  politics  independently  of  the  value  of  inclusive
18.  Cf  Holder v. Hall,  512  U.S.  874,  891  (1994)  (Thomas,  J.,  concurring).  According  to
Justice  Thomas,  Section Two of the  Voting Rights Act reaches  only state enactments "that  limit
citizens'  access  to  the  ballot"  despite  the  language  of the  statute,  which  states  that  the  term
"'voting'  includes all  action  necessary  to  make  a  vote effective."  Id. at  893,  919 (Thomas,  J.,
concurring)  (citing  Allen  v. State Bd.  of  Elections,  393  U.S.  544,  566  (1969)).  He  thus railed
against  the  dominant judicial  approach  ("a  disastrous  misadventure  in judicial  policymaking")
that viewed Section Two  as a tool  to overturn  districting or other practices that unfairly dilute  the
capacity  of cohesive  minority groups  to elect candidates  of their choice.  Id. at 893  (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
19.  CATHERINE  ESCHLE,  GLOBAL  DEMOCRACY,  SOCIAL  MOVEMENTS  AND  FEMINISM  17
(2001)  (quoting a  1992  statement  by John  Dunn); see also JAMES  MORONE,  THE  DEMOCRATIC
WISH:  POPULAR  PARTICIPATION  AND  THE LIMITS  OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 5-6 (Yale  Univ.
Press rev.  ed. 1998)  (1990).
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participation." 20  If we can acknowledge  that democracy  is a system for
structuring  power  relations,  we  can  begin  to  reconceptualize  our
own  approach  to  valuing  the  interests  and  voices  of  the  losers,
not just those of the winners.  We  can  fortify  the  greatest  resource  of
any  functioning  democracy-the  people  themselves-by  building
intermediate institutions  that restore the link between the people and the
act of political decision-making.  In other words, it is time  to confront
the  paradox  of  a  democratic  system  that  perpetuates  rather  than
dismantles hierarchy.
21
Of  course,  building  consensus  for  structural  reforms  that  give
ordinary  people  a larger  voice  in the  American  political  system  is  an
ambitious  project.  Democracy is not susceptible  to  a single  definition,
and  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  those  who  presently  enjoy
unfettered  access  to decision-making  opportunity  will  simply  agree  to
share it with others, especially those they deem  less qualified.  As  Dean
Michael  Fitts  observes,  it is  unlikely  we  can  achieve  "a  normatively
precise  theory  of  democracy"  to  instruct  and  resolve  heated  debates
"over the regulation of the electoral  process. '22  Yet, as Professor Pildes
points  out, after Bush v.  Gore, questioning  "the  structures,  institutions,
and ground rules of democracy..,  can no longer be avoided. ' 23  When
the Supreme  Court, with  little guidance  from prior precedents,  acted to
stop the counting of ballots and handed one candidate  the presidency of
the United States,  the temporary  stability  such  intervention yielded  was
by  no  means  permanent.  By  removing  the  choice  from  the  voters
themselves,  the Court's  actions might portend  even greater  withdrawal
of those  same  voters  from all  aspects  of democratic  participation  over
time.
In  sum,  the  Court's  involvement  in  George  W.  Bush's  peculiar
ascension  to  the  presidency  highlights  the  "democracy-as-fortress"
mentality.  Comfortable  with  the  calcified  architecture  of our system,
many pundits, members of the governing elite, and both political parties
also advocate  for what  is familiar  rather than  what is  fair.  As  a result,
the  Court  is not  alone  in its  disregard  for two foundational  ideas  of a
multiracial  democracy:  (1)  that  the  people  themselves  are  capable  of
20.  Ian  Shapiro,  The State of Democratic Theory, in POLITICAL  SCIENCE:  THE  STATE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 235, 240 (Ira Katznelson & Helen Milner eds., W.W. Norton  & Co. 2002) (1983).
21.  While a hierarchy  may  be  created  in  democratic  ways,  "hierarchies  have  propensities  to
atrophy  into systems  of domination,  necessitating  institutional  constraints  that  shift  burdens  of
proof to those who would defend them."  Id. at 262.
22.  Michael  A. Fitts,  The Hazards of Legal Fine Tuning: Confronting the Free Will Problem
in Election Law Scholarship, 32 LOY. L.A. L.  REV.  1121,  1139  (1999).
23.  Pildes, Constitutionalizing  Democratic Politics,  supra  note  6, at  157.
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governing; and (2)  that such capacity requires interactive, engaging, and
egalitarian  spaces  in  which  the  people  can  become  informed,  can
deliberate, and can eventually influence public decision-making.
Part I of this Essay explores in greater detail a few of the more salient
assumptions  surrounding  the  Court's  decision  in  Bush  v.  Gore.24   1
suggest  that  this  decision,  as  flawed  as  it was,  must be understood  as
one  of a series of Court judgments  that privilege hierarchical  rules over
more participatory  forms  of democratic  decision-making.  The  Court's
decision must be understood  in the context of a political system that has
neither  shaken  its roots in  oligarchy  nor  offered  an equitable  voice  to
people  of color,  poor  people,  and  women-problems  for  which  the
Supreme  Court is  only partially  responsible.  Part II explores  how  the
stories of both  liberals  and conservatives  reward, and  then justify, rule
by the  most  privileged  Americans. 25  Part  III  then  examines  ways  to
reconceptualize  democratic  citizenship  to benefit  us all. 26  I  argue  that
the experience  of black voters in Florida showcased  the need for such  a
reconceptualization,  and  this  movement  must  ultimately  tie  the
experiences  of Americans  of color  to  poor and  working-class  whites.
It  is  only  by  creating  intermediate  institutions,  which  can  engage
multiracial  groups  of citizens  throughout the  political process,  that  we
will  begin  to  see  what  a  richly  participatory  and  more  egalitarian
democracy  might look like.  Finally, in Part IV, I respond to criticisms
that  my  analysis  wrongly  privileges  procedural  over  substantive
justice.27  The informal  tone of this  section tracks the ad hoc exchange  I
had  with Professor Seidman at the February  2002 Conference.  There,  I
argued  against  paternalistic  approaches  to  justice  where  an  "expert"
creates  and  implements  solutions to  major social  problems.  I  continue
to  believe  that  good  social  policies  will  likely  emerge  if the  people
themselves are given the opportunity and the resources to help make the
decisions that will affect their lives.
I.  THE DECISION
Before  turning  to  the  hierarchical  assumptions  underlying  the
Supreme Court's analysis in Bush v.  Gore, it is worth briefly  noting the
24.  See infra Part  I  (analyzing  the majority  opinion  in  Bush  v.  Gore and  its perpetration  of
inequality in the voting process).
25.  See infra Part  II  (discussing  the  influence  of merit-based  tests  on the  equality  of voting
opportunities).
26.  See infra Part  III  (proposing  a new  vision  of democracy  based  on  examples  from  other
nations).
27.  See  infra  Part  IV  (discussing  the  benefits  to  social  justice  as  a  result  of  greater
participation  by individuals in public policy  debates).
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role of our nation's  anti-democratic heritage  in making it possible for a
candidate  who  lost  the  popular  vote  to  accede  to  the  presidency  by
"winning"  the  Electoral  College.  As  Yale  law  professor  Akhil  Amar
argues,  the Electoral  College  was  established  as  a device  to  boost  the
power of  Southern  states  in the  election of the  President.28  The  same
"compromise"  that  gave  Southern  states  more  House  members  by
counting  slaves  as three-fifths  of a person  for purposes  of apportioning
representation  (while  giving  the  slaves  none  of  the  privileges  of
citizenship),  gave  those states  Electoral  College votes  in proportion  to
their congressional  delegation.  Treating non-voting slaves as a political
asset  shifted  power  to  the  Southern  states;  not  surprisingly,  Southern
slaveholding presidents  governed the nation for roughly fifty of the first
seventy-two  years of our country's existence.  As a result, the institution
of slavery,  and  the  concept  of black  inferiority  on which  it depended,
defined the institutions  of democracy  itself.  As Henry Wiencek writes,
"With  their  eyes open,  the  founders  traded  away the rights  of African-
Americans,  many of whom had fought bravely in the revolution,  so that
the  national enterprise  could  go forward.",29  The  fact that  George  W.
Bush lost the popular vote, yet gained the oval  office through this  very
same  Electoral  College,  is  a  depressing  reminder  that  the  legacy  of
racism  distorts  our  governing  structures  to  reinforce  a  tradition  of
hierarchy.
However,  this  tradition is complex insofar  as concepts  that  structure
and  institutionalize  inequality  co-exist  with  values  of  democratic
opportunity.  The  fact that  five justices  of the  United  States  Supreme
Court  ultimately  decided  the  closely contested  presidential  election  of
2000,  on  the grounds  of equal protection  of the law,  simply  highlights
these  contradictions between  our rhetoric and our practice.  The Court,
elsewhere  unwilling to enforce a broad view  of the rights of individuals
of  color  to  equal  protection,  took  an  expansive  view  of  the  equal
protection claim  in Bush v.  Gore.  Evoking  the fulsome language of the
more  liberal  Warren  Court  opinions  in the  early  one  person,  one  vote
28.  Akhil  Amar,  A  Constitutional  Accident Waiting to Happen, 12  CONST.  COMMENT.  143,
144 (1995).
29.  Henry  Wiencek,  Yale  and the Price of Slavery, N.Y.  TIMES,  Aug.  18,  2001,  at  A15,
available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
If the founders had such  misgivings over slavery,  how is it that they allowed slavery to
continue?  The  answer  is  not  that they  didn't  know  any  better,  but  that  they  kept
slavery  so the  Southern states  would join  the union.  It was  a transaction,  a deal, just
like  the  deal  that put the  national capital  on  the Potomac  in exchange  for the federal
assumption of states'  debts ....
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cases  of  Reynolds  v.  Sims30  and  Harper v.  Virginia State  Board of
Elections, 31 the current Court majority  ruled, in the name of George  W.
Bush's  rights  to  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  that  the  recounting  of
Florida's closely divided votes could  not continue.32  In stark contrast to
much of its own recent precedent, the Supreme  Court boldly entered  the
political thicket  to declare  the  right of a political  candidate-and  only
one  political  candidate  at that-to  have  all  the  votes  counted  using  a
single standard.33
The  Court  extended  the  equal  protection  of  the  right  to  vote  to  an
entirely new terrain-to  the operation  of the ballot counting machinery.
Instead  of protecting  equal  and  meaningful  access  to  the ballot  for all
voters,  it focused  on  the  "formulation  of  uniform  rules"  to  determine
each  voter's  intent  after the  ballots  were  already  cast.34   Only  at  the
moment  of  tabulating  votes  ballot-by-ballot  were  specific,
uniform  standards  suddenly  practicable;  they  were  also,  the  Court
concluded,  "necessary"  to  ensure  "equal  application"  of  the  law.35
This  formulation  ignored  idiosyncratic  local  rules,  which  made  it  hard
for  some  voters  to  cast  a  ballot  in  the  first  place;36  such  disparate
procedures  at  the county  level caused  some  who  showed  up to vote  to
be  effectively  disenfranchised.  This  led  to  the  enormous  county-by-
county differences  in the accessibility  or accuracy  of voting technology.
Yet the  Court majority  apparently  was  not moved  to consider  whether
such  inequities  in  access  to  voting  might  disturb  the  "confidence  all
citizens must have in the outcome of elections." 37
According  to  many  scholars,  the  Court's  failure  to  examine  the
widespread  inequality  in ballot  access  and  technology,  while  invoking
30.  Reynolds  v.  Sims,  377  U.S.  533  (1964)  (holding  that  two plans  to  apportion  seats  in the
Alabama Legislature violated the Equal  Protection Clause).
31.  Harper  v.  Va.  State  Bd.  of  Elections,  383  U.S.  663  (1966)  (holding  that  the  Equal
Protection Clause prohibited the  creation of a poll  tax by the  State of Virginia).
32.  Bush v. Gore, 531  U.S.  98,  111  (2000) (per curiam).
33.  The Court made sure to assert that its ruling applied  only to the circumstances  surrounding
the  election  of George  W.  Bush.  Id. at  109  (per curiam)  ("Our consideration  is  limited  to  the
present  circumstances  .... ").
34.  Id. at 106 (per curiam).
35.  Id. (per curiam).
36.  See  infra notes  119-24  and  accompanying  text (discussing  disproportionate  rejection  of
ballots cast by African-Americans).
37.  The brief submitted on behalf of Gore pointed out that Florida's sixty-seven counties  used
four different  vote tabulation  mechanisms  and that  "[t]he use  of different vote tabulating  systems
undoubtedly  will  generate  tabulation differences  from  county  to  county."  Br. of Resp't Albert
Gore, Jr. at 42, Bush  v. Gore,  531  U.S. 98  (2000) (No. 00-949), available at 2000 WL  1809151.
Nevertheless,  the  Court  only  addressed  the  equal  protection  implications  of  the  supposedly
different standards that  officials used during the recount.
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the Equal Protection Clause at the moment of recounting ballots, created
nothing more than a false patina of legitimacy. 38  In reality, meaningful
democratic equality was  not a concern.  Rather, a set of anti-egalitarian
premises  apparently  provided  the  philosophical  foundation  for  the
decision to enjoin the democratic  process  altogether and thus  hand Mr.
Bush  the  presidency.3 9  Black  voters,  elderly  Jewish  voters  in  Palm
Beach  County,  and  poor people  throughout  the  state  of Florida  were
disenfranchised  and  left without  a  remedy.  Principles  of meritocracy
justified their disenfranchisement. 40  Essentially,  they  had to pass  a test
to have their ballots counted, and  the implicit suggestion  was that only
those  who  passed  this  test  actually  deserve  to  participate  in  the
democratic process.
That  our  constitutional  democracy  would  permit  the
disenfranchisement  of  thousands-perhaps  millions-of  voters  is  a
function of the Court's ambivalence toward basic democratic  principles,
and  its  longstanding  preference  for  order  over  participation.  In  her
concurring  opinion  in  a  political  gerrymandering  case,  Davis  v.
Bandemer, 41  Justice  O'Connor  suggested  as  much  when  she  asserted
that a commitment to stability and  measured change is the sine qua non
of a functioning  democracy. 42  That  is,  "the emergence  of a strong  and
stable  two-party  system  in  this  country  has  contributed  enormously  to
sound  and  effective  government.  The  preservation  and  health  of our
political institutions, state and federal,  depends to no small extent on the
continued vitality  of our two-party  system,  which permits  both stability
38.  For example, Heather  Gerken  argued that "[the]  Court,  in announcing a  new type of equal
protection  claim,  is  simply  reverting to one  of its  worst habits  in  voting-rights  cases: decision-
making  unmoored  from  an  explicit  normative  theory."  Heather  Gerken,  New  Wine  in  Old
Bottles: A  Comment on Richard Hasen's and Richard Briffault's Essays on Bush  v.  Gore,  29
FLA.  ST.  U.  L.  REV. 407, 422  (2001)  ("The  Court's failure to wrestle with these questions-what
does  equality mean,  and how  far should  we  go  to  attain  it  when  the twin  problems  of race  and
poverty  permeate our  democratic  structures?-gives  an  unwarranted  patina  of legitimacy  to  the
election system.");  see also Frank Michelman,  Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U.  CHI. L.  REV.
679, 693  (2001)  ("The justices of the Bush v  Gore majority  might  be  imagined  as  Machiavelli's
new  prince,  a  ruler and savior prepared  to sacrifice  all  to save  the  imperiled  republic-probity,
reputation,  even the salvation of an honored  place in history.").
39.  Indeed,  in  a  timely  and eerily  propitious  op-ed  analyzing  the  class  war  in  meritocratic
terms,  David Lebedoff suggested  in  August 2000  that the  removal  of decision-making  from the
people has  become  characteristic of the legal  system  itself.  "Increasingly,  too,  major decisions
are  made  by  judges  and  administrators  virtually  immune  from  electoral  reproach,  let  alone
removal."  David Lebedoff, The Class War Gore Could Lose, N.Y. TIMES,  Aug. 27,  2000, § 4, at
15, available  at LEXIS, News  Library, The New York Times File.
40.  For a more in-depth discussion of this point, see infra Part III.
41.  Davis  v. Bandemer,  478 U.S.  109 (1986)  (plurality opinion).
42.  Id. at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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and  measured  change."43   This  preference  for mechanical  or  tradition-
bound rules  that  privilege  stability  and  measured  change  over  genuine
and  broad-based  democratic  participation  also  underlies  the  Court's
recent jurisprudence  in  its  decisions  to:  (1)  tolerate  extreme  political
gerrymandering  that essentially  predetermines electoral outcomes  when
districts are drawn, thus, rendering elections  virtually meaningless;44 (2)
yet  apply  strict  scrutiny  to  majority-minority  districts  designed  to
provide  people  of  color a  fair  opportunity  to  elect  candidates  of their
choice; 45   (3)  rule  that  the  First  Amendment  prohibits  campaign
expenditure  limits  and certain  other measures  designed to limit the role
of private  money  in politics; 46  (4)  privilege  the  associational  rights  of
the  two  major  parties  at  the  expense  of  broad-based  participation  in
primaries;47 and (5)  uphold  various devices, such  as  strict ballot access
requirements,  that  inhibit  the  possibility  of  third  parties  playing  a
significant role in the political process.48
43.  Id. at  144-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44.  In Bandemer, the Court ruled that political gerrymandering  was justiciable, but the Court's
threshold  is  so  high that  only once  have  plaintiffs  successfully  brought  a  partisan  vote dilution
claim.  Id. at  132 (plurality  opinion);  see also infra text  accompanying  notes  86-97 (discussing
the effects  of political redistricting  and the Court's  application of heightened  scrutiny).
45.  See Bush v.  Vera, 517 U.S.  952,  958 (1996)  (challenging a redistricting  plan by the Texas
legislature that created three districts in which  racial minorities were  the  majority);  Shaw v. Hunt,
517  U.S.  899,  904-05  (1996)  (rehearing the  equal  protection  claim  in Shaw  v.  Reno); Miller  v.
Johnson,  515  U.S.  900,  915  (1995)  (alleging  that  the  State  of  Georgia  violated  the  Equal
Protection  Clause  by creating  a  new  voting  district);  Shaw  v.  Reno,  509  U.S.  630, 643  (1993)
(holding  that  the  State  of  North  Carolina  violated  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  by  enacting  a
redistricting plan that resulted  in "segregated"  voting districts).
46.  See  Colo.  Republican  Fed. Campaign  Comm'n  v.  FEC,  518  U.S.  604,  614-15  (1996)
(claiming  that  the  First  Amendment  prohibits  the  application  of the  Federal  Campaign  Act  of
1971's  limit on  campaign expenditures);  Buckley  v.  Valeo, 424 U.S.  1, 17  (1976)  (challenging
the constitutionality  of the limit on campaign expenditures of the Federal Campaign  Act of  1971).
47.  See Cal.  Democratic  Party  v.  Jones,  530  U.S.  567,  572  (2000) (alleging  that  the State  of
California  violated  the  First  Amendment  by  implementing  a  "blanket"  primary);  Ark.  Educ.
Television  Comm'n  v.  Forbes,  523  U.S.  666,  673-74  (1997)  (arguing  that  the  Arkansas
Educational  Television  Commission  adhered  to the  First  Amendment  when  refusing to allow  a
congressional  candidate  to participate  in a televised debate).
48.  While the Court has struck down  some  of the most egregious  laws attempting  to deny fair
access to third parties, its concerns  about destabilizing  threats to the two-party system can also be
found  in  opinions  on  blanket  primaries,  fusion  candidates,  and  party  raiding.  See,  e.g.,  Cal.
Democratic Party, 530  U.S.  at 576-78;  Timmons  v.  Twin Cities Area New  Party,  520 U.S.  351,
366-67  (1997)  ("destabilizing  effects  of  party-splintering  and  excessive  factionalism"  from
fusion tickets);  Burdick  v.  Takushi,  504  U.S.  428, 439 (1992)  ("divisive  sore-loser  candidacies"
might emerge  from allowing  write-in  voting  in  one-party  Hawaii); Munro  v.  Socialist  Workers
Party,  479 U.S.  189 (1986).  Justice  Antonin  Scalia offered a  remarkable defense  for the Court's
tolerance of laws that unfairly  promote  the existing two-party  system and the alienation  it  brings
to large segments  of the electorate:  "The  voter  who feels himself disenfranchised  should simply
join the party."  Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S.  at 584;  see also Theodore  Lowi,  Deregulating
the Duopoly: Two Party  System Offers Narrow Choice, NATION,  Dec. 4, 2000, at 7.34  Loyola University Chicago Law Journal  [Vol.  34
Reflecting  upon this pattern,  Professors Heather Gerken  and Spencer
Overton join Professor Pildes in his  observation  that Bush v.  Gore was
part  of  the  Court's  longstanding  failure  to  examine  our  democratic
principles  to  develop  legal  rules  that  foster  an  energetic  and
inclusionary  vision  of  democracy. 49   The  elevation  of  stability  and
measured  change  to  a  preferred  status  as  the primary  goal  of politics
disconnects  democracy  from its participatory ideal.50   The combination
of a  thin  and  mechanistic  view  of democracy  and a  similarly  thin  and
mechanistic  view of equality reinforces the ability of the elite within the
two major parties to compete among themselves for the reigns of power
while  manipulating elections  to assure the desired outcome.  In effect, a
symbiotic relationship has  developed between judicial  commitments  to
principles of stability and an electoral process that saps voter choice  and
suppresses  voter turnout.51  The Supreme  Court's role  in Bush v.  Gore
must be  assessed in the light of this phenomenon,  which has deep roots
in our country's jurisprudential tradition.
Professor  Pildes,  for  example,  writes  about  a  Supreme  Court  case
early  in the  twentieth century in which  Justice Oliver Wendell  Holmes
ruled that the  Court was helpless in the face of the elimination of black
49.  Gerken, supra note 38, at  408.
One  of the  great  oddities  in  the  Supreme  Court's  voting-rights  jurisprudence  dating
back  to the  Warren  Court  is  that  the Justices  often  disavow  the  notion  that they  are
importing  a  particular  theory  of  democracy  into  the  decision.  Their  claim  to
agnosticism  is, of course, implausible.  And  the Court's  self-conscious  preference  for
avoiding  any  discussion  of  its  normative  premises  has  led  to  the  type  of decision
making  we  see in the Bush v. Gore per curiam:  an  opinion that articulates the injury in
an  abstract, formal  manner;  announces  a  legal  rule  with  no  easily discernible  limits;
defines  equality  in  mechanical,  quantitative  terms;  and  fails  to  address  the  hard
normative issues embedded  in the questions it resolves.
Id.; see also Spencer  Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29
FLA. ST.  U. L. REV.  469 (2001).
50.  Richard  Pildes,  Democracy and Disorder,  68  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  695,  707  (2001)  (citing
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366).  Pildes concludes  that "[t]he  central image  in this opinion  is not that
of invigorated democracy  through  'political  competition,'  but  that  of  a  system  whose  crucial
'political  stability'  is  easily  threatened.  The  word  'stable'  (and  variations  of  it)  appears  a
remarkable ten times in the brief majority opinion."  Id. at 708.
51.  For  example,  as  I  discuss  shortly,  radical  gerrymandering  shifts  electoral  choices  to
incumbent  politicians  and  makes  elections  "sclerotic  and  immune  to change."  David  Garrow,
Ruining the House, N.Y.  TIMES,  Nov.  13,  2002,  at 29A, available at LEXIS,  News Library,  The
New  York  Times  File  (arguing  that  election  officials  and  politicians  use  districting  to  make
elections  less competitive,  which drives  voters  from  the  polls);  see also infra notes  85-90  and
accompanying  text (explaining how  incumbent  politicians  design  districts and  the  effect of that
design on the voters in the districts).  Meanwhile the Court, for the most part, looks the other way.
See infra note  93 and accompanying text (explaining how few gerrymandering claims succeed).Supreme Democracy:  Bush v.  Gore Redux
citizens  from  political  participation  in  Alabama. 52   Jackson  Giles,  "a
literate  black  man  and  Republican-party  activist,"  who  had  a  federal
patronage  job  as  janitor  in  the  federal  courthouse  in  Montgomery,
Alabama,  "had  registered  and  voted  in  Montgomery  from  1871
to  1901." 53   Giles,  represented  by  a  lawyer  hired  by  Booker  T.
Washington,  challenged  the  handiwork  of  the  1901  Alabama
Constitutional  Convention  that  disenfranchised  him  (and  countless
others)  with,  in  the  words  of the  convention's  president,  the  explicit
purpose  "'to  establish  white  supremacy  in this  State."' 54   In  a  classic
"catch-22,"  "Holmes  concluded  that  the very  wrong  Giles  complained
of  made  impossible  the  relief  he  sought."55   If  the  statute  were  a
fraudulent  scheme,  as  Giles  suggested,  and  were  the  Court  to  order
Giles's name  added to the voter registration list, the Court would itself
be  party  to  the  very  fraud  at  issue.56   The  Court  also  refused,  on  the
grounds  of its  institutional  incompetence,  to  intervene.57   It  lacked  the
enforcement  authority  to protect Giles's rights  "when  the great mass of
the whitefs]"  in Alabama were opposed to his voting.58
It is striking  how  similar the effects  of the Supreme Court's decision
in  Bush  v.  Gore are  with  those  of Giles v.  Harris,  even  as  Holmes's
opinion  in  Giles, in  Pildes'  words,  "has  been  airbrushed  out  of  the
constitutional  canon." 59   While  its  reasoning  was  couched  in  the
language  of equal  protection,  the  Court's  ruling  in Bush v. Gore also
52.  Richard Pildes,  Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17  CONST. COMMENT.  295,
306  (2000)  [hereinafter  Pildes,  Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon].  The case  Pildes
discusses is Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903).
53.  Pildes, Democracy,  Anti-Democracy, and the Canon,  supra note 52, at 299.
54.  Id. at 302 (quoting  Hunter v. Underwood, 471  U.S. 222, 229 (1985)).
55.  Id. at 306 (citing Giles, 189  U.S. at 486-87).
56.  Id. (citing  Giles, 189 U.S.  at 486).
57.  Id. at 307 (citing Giles, 189 U.S. at 488).
58.  Id. at 306 (citing Giles, 189 U.S. at 488).  In  fact, there is some evidence that  a majority of
whites actually  voted  against the  disfranchising  constitution, and that  it  only passed because  the
votes  of blacks,  who  never appeared  at the  polls,  were  nevertheless  counted  as  supporting  their
own disfranchisement.  ("The disfranchising  constitution was approved with only 57% of the vote
(a margin  of 26,879  votes)"  and in  fifty-four of the  state's  sixty-six  counties,  the total  vote  was
actually  against  the  constitution.  Approval  only  came  with  the  36,224  to  5471  vote  for  the
constitution  in  twelve  Black-Belt counties  where  three  times  as  many  votes  were  cast  for the
constitution as  the number of white  men eligible  to vote.)  Id. at  315-16.  The elite  landowners,
who used  their control of the Democratic  Party  to discourage  alliances between  poor  whites and
blacks, engineered the voting.  Id.
59.  Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, supra note 52,  at 297.  For example,
Justice  Frankfurter  cites Giles v. Harris in Colegrove v. Green, 328  U.S.  549,  552,  573  (1946),
where  he  coined  the now  infamous  terminology  "political  thicket" and  cautioned that the  Court
must stay out of it, id. at 556.  Yet the same case,  Giles v. Harris,  does not receive any mention in
four of the  leading Constitutional  Law  casebooks.  Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the
Canon, supra note 52,  at 297.
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upheld  the rights  of a  majority of white people  to choose  the President
of  the  United  States;  meanwhile,  many  blacks  (and  others)  were
disenfranchised  in  Florida,  as  were  all  blacks  and  many  poor  whites
almost 100 years earlier in Alabama.61  Holmes's putative commitment
to  majority  rule  was  hardly  democratic  since  it  failed  to  consider  the
protection and  inclusion of the minority; this same lesson is clearly  still
relevant in the context of the Court's failure in Bush v. Gore to value the
discarded  votes  of Americans  of color.  Similarly, Holmes's  contorted,
or in Pildes'  term  "repellant,"  logic  and the Bush v.  Gore per curiam's
opinion  both  value  disingenuous  uniformity  and  the  appearance  of
stability  over genuine  equality  in  democratic  participation. 62  In these
ways, the five member majority in Bush v.  Gore continues  the benighted
trajectory  of  opinions  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  simultaneously
"remov[es]  [genuine]  democracy  from  the  agenda  of  constitutional
law," 63  while  it  intervenes  to  uproot  democratic  innovations  that
threaten the status quo.
As the political scientist Alex Keyssar points out:
[T]he  very  unpretty  election  of  last  November  emerged  from  deep
currents  in  American  political  life.  Although  we  don't  like  to
acknowledge  it, there  have  always been  strong anti-democratic  forces
in  the  United  States.  Large  numbers  of Americans,  throughout  our
history,  have  not  believed  in  universal  suffrage  and  have  acted
accordingly.
64
Keyssar  emphasizes  elsewhere,  in  his  treatise  on  the  right  to  vote,  a
factor  crucial  to  understanding  our  democratic  ambivalence:  those
opposed  to  universal  suffrage  were  members  of  the  founding  elite.65
Their  influence  disenfranchised  vast  numbers  of  our  population  from
the  very  beginning  of our constitutional  democracy;  their  assumptions
60.  Bush was able to poll a majority of the votes cast by whites, including many working-class
whites,  to make the  contest  in  Florida close. This  was also  true  nationwide.  Even the  so-called
gender gap is only apparent when  the votes of black women are also  included.  When only white
women's  voting  patterns are  observed,  a small plurality  preferred Bush.  See Marjorie  Connelly,
The  Election; Who  Voted:  A  Portrait  of American Politics, 1976-2000, N.Y.  TIMES,  Nov.  12,
2000,  §  4,  at  4,  available at LEXIS,  News  Library,  The  New  York  Times  File.  Gore  did,
however, score impressive wins among voters from union households.  Id.
61.  Of course,  it is important  to note that  unlike Mr.  Giles's attorney, Mr. Gore's lawyers  did
not  raise  the  disenfranchisement  issue  on  the grounds  of race.  Indeed,  the  disenfranchisement
was subtler and not universal.  Nevertheless,  the burdens fell  heavily on those  voters most easily
confused, discouraged,  and traditionally  disadvantaged.
62.  Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, supra note 52, at 298.
63.  Id. at 296.
64.  Alex Keyssar,  Reform and an Evolving Electorate, N.Y.  TIMES, Aug.  5,  2001,  §  4, at  13,
available  at LEXIS,  News Library, The New York Times File.
65.  Id.; see also KEYSSAR,  supra note  10,  at xxi-xxii,  67-70, 78-80.
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that the elite  should  rule helped  contract  not only  the right to  vote  but
also  the right  to cast an  effective  vote.  The Americans  who  harbored
such  ambivalence  continued  beyond  the  early  years  of our  country's
history  to  include,  at  different  stages,  the  leadership  of  both  the
Democratic  and  Republican  Parties.  Both  political  parties  have
cooperated,  some  might even  say conspired,  to constrict  the electorate
in order to insure their own dominance.
This  highly  anti-democratic  impulse  has  had  devastating
consequences  for disadvantaged  individuals of all races.  Few among us
are  familiar  with  the  way  the  leaders  of  the  Democratic  Party,  for
example,  orchestrated  the  disenfranchisement  of  blacks  as  well  as
masses  of  poor  whites  throughout  the  South  during  the  late  1800s
and  early  1900s.66   According  to  Professor  Pildes,  "the  framers  of
disfranchisement  were  typically  the  most  conservative,  large
landowning,  wealthy  faction  of the  Democratic  Party,  who  were  also
seeking  to  entrench  their  partisan  power and  fend off challenges  from
Republicans,  Populists, other  third parties, as  well as  the  more populist
wings  of the Democratic  Party."67  Their  goal  was  to  remove  the  less
educated  and impoverished whites who  might be inclined to join forces
with  the  even  more  impoverished  blacks  to  challenge  the  Democrats'
one-party  rule.68  The Democratic Party  was "the  organized  vehicle  of
white  supremacy"  and  it  "regained  control  of  the  legislature  and
governor's office  by framing  politics  around  issues  of race rather  than
economics  or  class."69  The  Democratic  Party  aimed  to  thwart  the
conditions  that  made  for  genuine  multi-party  competition  and  greater
participation  by  poor  and  uneducated  whites  as  well  as  blacks.  And
these  tactics  were  extraordinarily  successful.  By  the  early  1900s,  a
combination  of  poll  taxes,  literacy  tests,  and  other  devices  that
discouraged  the  uneducated  from  voting  had  stripped  roughly  three-
quarters  of  the  Southern  male  population-black  and  white--of  the
right to vote.
70
The  unseemly  role  of  the  Democratic  Party  in  the  South  at  the
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  foreshadowed  more  contemporary
complaints  that  some  in  the  Republican  Party  orchestrated,  or at  least
66.  FRANCES  Fox PIVEN  &  RICHARD  A.  CLOWARD,  WHY  AMERICANS  DON'T VOTE  78-80
(1988).
67.  Pildes, Democracy,  Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, supra note 52, at 302.
68.  See J. MORGAN  KOUSSER,  THE  SHAPING  OF SOUTHERN  POLITICS  238-65 (1974).
69.  Pildes, Democracy,  Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, supra note 52, at 313-14 (describing
events in North  Carolina, where  "a fusion coalition of Republicans  and  Populists  ...  controlled
the state legislature"  through  1898, with black and white  support).
70.  PIVEN & CLOWARD,  supra  note 66, at 80-84.
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benefited  from,  the  massive  disenfranchisement  of Florida's  voters  in
Election  2000.  Moreover,  in  part  due  to  the  aforementioned  bias  in
voting technology, even when poor people do go to the ballot box, their
votes are three times more likely to go uncounted than the votes of their
affluent  white counterparts. 71  And, if this differential  participation rate
were  not  enough,  the  exceptional  importance  of  private  money  in
American  politics,  by  international  standards,  provides  the  country's
elites  with  an  additional  lever  to  influence  policymaking.  Efforts  to
disenfranchise  voters,  in  other words,  are not limited  to idiosyncrasies
of  either  the  current  conservative  Supreme  Court  majority  or  one
political  ideology.  Nor  have  these  exclusionary  tactics  always  been
based on race or even class.
After New Jersey passed a law barring even  property-holding  women
from  voting  in  1807,  "women  everywhere  in  the  nation  were
barred  from  the  polls."  Elites  employed  the  ideology  of  virtual
representation-suggesting  that  women  were  represented  by  their
husbands, brothers and fathers  73-to deny  women  the franchise  in most
of the  country  until  the  ratification  of  the  Nineteenth  Amendment  in
1920.  During  this  period,  the  Supreme  Court,  influenced  by  the
founders, refused to  intervene  in  yet another  voting  case.  In  1874,  the
Court  unanimously  rejected  a claim  by Virginia Minor that Missouri's
gender-based  disenfranchisement  violated  the  First  and  Fourteenth
Amendments. 74  The Court ruled that
suffrage  was  not  coextensive  with  citizenship;  and  thus  that  states
possessed  the  authority to  decide  which  citizens  could and  could not
vote.  Bringing  an  end  to  debates  that  had  surfaced  periodically  for
decades,  the  Court  formally  ratified  the  severance  of  national
citizenship  from  suffrage  that the  late-eighteenth-century  authors  of
the  Constitution  had  devised  as  a  solution  to  their  own  political
problems.
75
What is significant, therefore,  is not simply the disconcerting parallel
between  the  disenfranchisement  of  blacks  at  the  turn  of  the
71.  David  Stout, Study Finds Ballot Problems Are More Likely for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2001,  at A9,  LEXIS,  News Library,  The New  York Times File.  Another  study revealed  that, in
total,  poor  voting  technology  contributed  to four  to  six  million  votes  being  uncounted  for  the
presidential  election,  and that  the  incidence  of uncounted  ballots  rose  to  even  higher levels for
other  contests.  See Guy Gugliotta,  Study Finds Millions of Votes Lost; Universities Urge Better
Technology,  Ballot Procedures, WASH.  POST,  July  17,  2001,  at  Al,  available at  2001  WL
23181142.
72.  KEYSSAR,  supra note  10, at 54.
73.  Id. at  174.
74.  Minor  v.  Happersett,  88 U.S. (21  Wall.)  162,  178  (1874).
75.  KEYSSAR,  supra note  10,  at  181  (citing Minor, 88 U.S. (21  Wall.)  at  163).2002] Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux
twentieth  and  twenty-first  centuries.  For  blacks,  women,  and  poor
whites,  Supreme  Court decisions  that avoid  engaging  basic democratic
principles affect our larger understanding  of democracy  itself.  The real
significance of the aftermath  of the 2000 presidential  election  is the way
that the disenfranchisement of blacks in Florida highlights the country's
history of tolerating disenfranchisement  across the board.76
The effective  disenfranchisement  of a major portion  of our citizenry
continues  over  200 years after the founding of the Republic.  Over four
million  Americans,  2.1%  of  the  country's  voting  age  population,  are
literally disenfranchised  because  of state  laws  limiting  ballot access  to
felons  and  ex-felons. 77  The great  majority of those  barred from voting
are  not  incarcerated;  they  are  either  ex-felons  or  on  parole  or
probation. 78  Many states with the harshest voting restrictions  trace their
laws  directly  to  the  Jim  Crow  period,  when  Southern  elites  first
sought  to  use  them  as  part  of  a  comprehensive  strategy  of  black
disenfranchisement. 79  Moreover,  given the disproportionate numbers of
blacks  and Latinos  who are prosecuted  and then  imprisoned (frequently
for the commission of crimes comparable  to those committed by  whites
who  nevertheless  escape  prison  time),  these  laws  continue  to  have  a
devastating  impact  on  African-Americans. 8°  Over  6%  of black  adults
76.  Efforts  to  ameliorate  the  absurd  levels  of  voter  disenfranchisement  are  haphazard  and
often  ineffective  despite  the media  scrutiny evoked  by  the  2000  election.  The state  spent  over
$30 million  in new voting technology;  yet,  because  it  failed to train  poll  workers or test the new
machines  in  advance,  Florida's  2002  Democratic  Primary  Election  was  characterized  by  the
effective disenfranchisement  of numerous voters in South  Florida: "Electronic  ballot devices  with
glitches  replaced hanging  chads.  Problems  with perforated  ballot cards  replaced problems  with
butterfly  ballots.  But the  result  was all  the  same:  disenfranchised  voters,  hand-counted  ballots
and delayed  results."  Dana  Canedy,  Again, Sunshine State in Dark a Day After the Vote,  N.Y.
TIMES,  Sept.  12,  2002,  at  A18, available at LEXIS,  News  Library,  The  New  York Times  File.
Faulty  equipment  forced  polling  officials  to turn  away  hundreds  of  voters  in  Liberty  City,  a
predominately  black neighborhood  in Miami.  Dana  Canedy,  Vote System Chaos Triumphs Again
in Florida  Election, N.Y.  TIMES, Sept.  11,  2002,  at A28, available at LEXIS,  News  Library, The
New York Times File.
77.  ELIZABETH  SIMSON,  JUSTICE  DENIED:  HOW  FELONY  DISENFRANCHISEMENT  LAWS
UNDERMINE AMERICAN  DEMOCRACY,  at v (Americans  for Democratic Action  Educ.  Fund 2002),
available at http://www.adaction.org/lizfullpaper.pdf  (last  visited Nov. 20, 2002).
78.  Id. at 24-25.
79.  Id. at  16.
80.  Prosecution  for drug  offenses  is  an  area  where  this  racial  bias  in  the  criminal  justice
system is particularly  dramatic.  Blacks represent  15%  of drug  users;  yet, they constitute  33%  of
drug arrests, 55%  of drug convictions,  and 74% of those  sentenced  to prison for nonviolent  drug
offenses.  LANI  GUINIER  &  GERALD  TORRES,  THE  MINER'S  CANARY:  ENLISTING  RACE,
RESISTING  POWER,  TRANSFORMING  DEMOCRACY  264 (2002).  Other  studies  have  documented
racial bias in other areas, notably including pre-textual  traffic  stops and pre-trial negotiations.  See
MARC  MAUER,  RACE  TO  INCARCERATE  chs.  7-8  (1999).  Moreover,  the  type  of  activities
legislatures  choose  to make  felonies  has  a  significantly  adverse  impact  on  Americans  of color.
Drunk driving  is responsible  for as many deaths  as deaths related to the drug trade.  Id. at 134-35.Loyola University  Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  34
nationwide  are  legally  forbidden  to  vote.8 1   In  both  Florida  and
Alabama,  which  along  with  eleven  other  states  permanently
disenfranchise  felons,82  31%  of black men are denied the right to cast a
ballot.83   Note  also  that  this  practice  is  unique  among  the  world's
democracies.
84
Other political procedures that effectively  disenfranchise even greater
numbers of Americans  are  more subtle but  no less  effective.  Through
the  extreme political gerrymandering  that  now  characterizes  every  new
round  of redistricting,  the  two-party  duopoly  divides  voters in  such  a
way  as  to ensure  that elections  are essentially  decided  before  a  single
vote is  cast.  Incumbent  politicians  design  districts  looking for voters,
and they capture voters who are likely to vote for them.85  For example,
Matthew  Dowd, President Bush's pollster, accurately predicted that the
latest  round  of  redistricting  would  give  each  party  almost  200  safe
congressional  seats  out  of  a  total  of  435.  Experts  for  both  parties
estimated  that  only  twenty-five  to  fifty  congressional  races  would  be
86 genuinely competitive in 2002.  In the 1990s, the juggernaut of radical
gerrymandering  meant  that  almost  75% of United  States  House  seats
did not change hands once, and  the parties  appeared to have  eliminated
even  more  competitive  seats  in  their  quest  to  maximize  incumbent
Nevertheless,  drunk  drivers  are "generally  charged  as  misdemeanants  and receive  sentences  of
fines,  license  suspension  and  community  service."  Id. at  135.  Seventy-eight  percent of those
arrested  for drunk driving  are white males.  Id.
81.  SIMSON,  supra note 77, at v.
82.  See id. at 25-26 (listing  states that permanently disenfranchise  felons).
83.  Id. at 29.
84.  Id. at 38.
85.  In  most  states,  state  legislatures  conduct  the  decennial  redistricting  for  both  state
legislative  and congressional  districts.  A  significant minority  of states  has created  redistricting
commissions, whose  compositions  and precise  role in the  redistricting process  vary  significantly
by state.  Only  a handful of states have completely removed the role of the legislature.  Moreover,
while  redistricting  commissions  may  in  some  cases have  better  partisan  balance  than  the  state
legislature,  representatives  of the two-party duopoly  generally dominate their  memberships.  See
Jeffrey  C.  Kubin, Note,  The Case for Redistricting  Commissions, 75  TEX.  L.  REv.  837,  841-45
(1997).  While Kubin concludes that redistricting commissions  "offer a viable means  of restoring
a degree of efficiency, fairness, and finality to a state's decennial  gerrymander,"  he acknowledges
that they  are  "no  panacea."  Id. at 838.  Moreover,  note  that whatever the  merits of independent
redistricting commissions, they in  no way  guarantee equitable representation  for people  of color.
See Adela de la Torre, Arizona Redistricting: Issues Surrounding Hispanic Voter Representation,
6 TEX.  HIsP.  J.L.  &  POL'Y  163  (2001);  Symposium, Drawing Lines  in the Sand: The  Texas
Latino Community and Redistricting  2001, 6 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y  1, 77-79 (2001)  (statement
of Will Harell).
86.  Ronald  Brownstein,  Close House Races Go the Way  of Rotary Phones, Newt Gingrich,
L.A. TIMES, Apr.  15,  2002, at A13, available  at 2002 WL 2468600.Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux
protection  in  the  2000  round  of redistricting.87   The  voters  who  are
consistently  on  the losing  side  in  these  safe  seats are  only  represented
virtually-they  are  represented  by a candidate  they didn't vote  for, but
who  many  of  their  neighbors  did,  just  as  women  in  the  nineteenth
century  were  supposedly  represented  by  officials  they  did  not vote  for
but who their male relatives and neighbors chose.
As bad as this situation is  with regard  to congressional elections,  it is
even  worse  at the state  level.  In over 40% of state legislative  elections
in  2000,  only  one  of  the two  major parties  placed  a candidate  on  the
ballot.88  Think  about  that  for  a  second:  four  out  of  ten  times  that
Americans  go  to vote  for their representative  in  the legislative body of
our  powerful  state governments,  they essentially  have  no  more choices
on  the  ballot  than  did  voters  in  the  Soviet  Union  or  other  countries
across  the world  where  authoritarian  regimes  continue  to hold  single-
party  "elections. "89   Once  again,  the  Supreme  Court's  preference  for
political  stability,  even  at  the  expense  of  genuine  democratic
participation, is clear in its approach to districting.
In Davis v.  Bandemer, the Court ruled  that  political  gerrymandering
could  give  rise  to  a justiciable  equal  protection  claim.90  However,  as
this  doctrine  has  evolved,  courts  have  set  an  extremely  high  bar  for
plaintiffs  to  succeed  in  meeting  the  Bandemer plurality's  conclusion
that  "unconstitutional  discrimination  occurs  only  when  the  electoral
system  is  arranged in  a manner that  will consistently  degrade  a voter's
or  a group  of voters'  influence  on the  political  process  as  a  whole."9 1
Essentially,  one  of  the  two  major  parties  must  demonstrate  that  the
districting  process has  virtually eliminated  its capacity  to elect  officials
statewide.92  This  burden has  proved  almost  impossible;  in the sixteen
87.  Id.; see also Garrow,  supra  note  51  (arguing  that  election  officials  and  politicians  use
districting to make elections less competitive);  infra note  152 and accompanying  text (discussing
manipulation of voting districts  by incumbents of both major parties).
88.  DOUGLAS  J.  AMY,  REAL  CHOICES/NEW  VOICES  86  (2d  ed.  2002)  (1993)  [hereinafter
AMY,  REAL CHOICES/NEW  VOICES].
89.  Some authoritarian  regimes continue to  control political  power by allowing only members
of the ruling party-or approved  non-partisan  candidates-to contest elections.  For instance,  in
February  of this year,  Laos  conducted  elections  for  its  109-member  National  Assembly.  The
ruling communist party won  108 seats,  and one approved non-partisan candidate  was also elected.
Elections Around the  World, Elections in Laos, at www.electionworld.org/election/laos.htm  (last
visited Sept. 29, 2002).
90.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.  109,  113,  143  (1986)  (plurality opinion).
91.  Id. at 132 (plurality opinion).
92.  Cf  Badham  v. March  Fong  Eu, 694 F. Supp.  664, 670  (N.D. Cal.  1988)  (holding that the
Republican Party  had not  stated  a cause of action under Bandemer despite  an electoral  map  that
consistently  left  Republicans  underrepresented  in  congressional  seats  compared  with  their
proportion  of the statewide  vote  because  "[t]here  are  no allegations  that  California  Republicans
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years  since Bandemer, only  once  has  a political  gerrymandering  claim
succeeded. 93
In marked contrast to its unwillingness  to enter the "political thicket"
in  these  gerrymandering  cases,  the  Court  has  taken  a  remarkably
interventionist stance in striking down districts designed  to allow people
of color to elect candidates  of their choice.  Despite what the advocates
of  colorblindness  would  like  us  to  believe,  voting  remains  highly
correlated  with  race  in  our  country. 94   Blacks  and  whites  generally
prefer  different  candidates  and  platforms.  To  ensure  that blacks  and
other people  of color have  a chance to elect  candidates  in our winner-
take-all  district  elections,  the  Voting  Rights  Act  and  its  amendments
encouraged  the  creation  of  majority-minority  districts  under  certain
circumstances.95   In  the  1990s,  the  Supreme  Court  ruled  in case  after
case that  districts  drawn  primarily  on  the  basis  of race  are  subject  to
strict  scrutiny  under  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.96   In  one  case
involving  a  single  congressional  district  in  North  Carolina,  the  case
went  up  and  down  to  the  Supreme  Court  four  times  within  one
districting cycle.
97
In  short,  the  Supreme  Court's  approach  to  districting-like  its
decision in Bush v. Gore, its use of the First Amendment  to strike down
campaign finance laws, and its toleration of various devices  designed  to
create  barriers  to new  parties  seeking  to disrupt the  current duopoly-
have been  'shut  out'  of the  political  process"), affd, 488 U.S.  1024 (1989).  Bernard Grofman
had called the plan at issue in the case "the most egregious gerrymander  of the decade."  Bernard
Grofman,  An  Expert  Witness  Perspective  on  Continuing  and  Emerging  Voting  Rights
Controversies:  From One Person, One Vote  to Partisan  Gerrymandering,  21  STETSON  L. REV.
783, 816 (1992).
93.  See  Republican  Party  of  N.C.  v.  Martin,  980 F.2d 943  (4th  Cir.  1992)  (finding  that the
plaintiff  Republican Party  had  stated  a  cause of action in alleging  that North  Carolina's  use  of
state-wide elections for superior court judges-an  "essentially" local office-had resulted in only
one Republican being elected  superior court judge in approximately  220 elections  between  1968
and  1992).  After  a trial, the  district  court  ordered elections  to be conducted  on  a district-basis
rather  than  statewide.  The Court  of Appeals,  however, later  vacated this  injunction  in light of
1994  elections  in  which  all eight  Republicans  seeking  statewide  election  to  superior  court  won.
Republican  Party  of N.C. v. Hunt,  77 F.3d  470 (4th Cir.  1996)  (per curiam) (unpublished  table
decision),  available  at 1996 WL 60439, at **4.
94.  See,  e.g.,  Bernard  Grofman  et  al.,  Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A  Conceptual
Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L.  REV.  1383,  1400-01  (2001)  (finding that
"a clear pattern of racial  bloc voting exists" in congressional elections in the South in the 1990s).
95.  See Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.  §§  1971-1974(e)  (2000).
96.  See,  e.g., Bush v. Vera,  517 U.S.  952  (1996);  Shaw v. Hunt,  517 U.S.  899 (1996);  Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
97.  The  district  I  am  referring  to was  North  Carolina's  12th  Congressional  District.  See
Easley  v.  Cromartie,  532  U.S.  234  (2001);  Hunt  v.  Cromartie,  526  U.S.  541  (1999);  Shaw  v.
Hunt, 517 U.S.  899 (1996)  [hereinafter Shaw I1]; Shaw v.  Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)  [hereinafter
Shaw 1].
[Vol.  34Supreme Democracy:  Bush v.  Gore Redux
represents  the imposition of the majority justices'  incongruous  vision  of
democracy.  On  the  one  hand,  they  are  committed  to  "stability  and
measured  change."  This  position  leads  them  to  decline  to  exercise
judicial  power,  in  cases  like  Giles  v.  Harris 98  or  even  Davis  v.
Bandemer, 99  where  the  Court  deferred  to  the  preferences  of  the
majority,  even  when  the  majority,  as  in  Bandemer,  is  artificially
manufactured.  On  the  other  hand,  they  aggressively  supervise  the
conduct  of  elections-overruling  the  decisions  of  state  legislative
bodies-when  the  majority  implements  measures  to  reform  electoral
politics in ways that conflict with the aesthetic  vision of certain justices.
This  inconsistent  approach  means  elites  continue  to  rule  and  efforts,
even  those  supported  by  local  majorities,  to  include  or  foster  the
participation  of  more  people  of  color,  poor  people,  and  women  are
frequently interrupted.
Consider  for  a  moment  why  changes  are  needed  to  facilitate  the
equitable  representation  of these  groups.  Despite  having  one  of  the
world's most active women's movements, women comprise only  13.8%
(a  record  high)  of  the  107th  United  States  Congress.' 00  In  Western
Europe,  women  make  up 23.9%  of the average  national  parliament.' 1 0
Worldwide,  the  United  States  ranks forty-fifth  in  its  representation  of
women  in  national  legislatures  or  parliaments. 1 0 2   Considering  its
long  history  as  a  multiracial,  polyethnic  society,  the  United  States
also  continues  to  be  exceptionally  poor  at  including  people  of color
in  politics.  African-Americans,  the  country's  largest  racial  minority,
comprise  slightly  over  12%  of  the  population  but  only  6.7%  of  the
107th  Congress. 1 0 3  In  New  Zealand,  people  of Maori descent-whose
situation  "[i]n  terms  of demographics  and  socioeconomic  status...  is
remarkably  similar  to  that  of  African-Americans  in  the  United
98.  Giles v.  Harris,  189 U.S.  475  (1903);  see also supra notes 52-58  and  accompanying  text
(discussing the  decision in Giles).
99.  Davis  v.  Bandemer, 478  U.S.  109 (1986)  (plurality  opinion);  see also supra  notes 41-43,
90-91  and accompanying  text (discussing the decision  in Bandemer).
100.  MILDRED L.  AMER,  CONG.  RESEARCH  SERV.,  MEMBERSHIP  OF  THE  107TH  CONGRESS:
A  PROFILE  CRS-i,  available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/politics/congress/profl07.pdf
(last modified Jan.  10, 2001).
101.  Calculations  from  table  in  MICHAEL  GALLAGHER  ET  AL.,  REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT  IN MODERN  EUROPE:  INSTITUTIONS,  PARTIES,  AND  GOVERNMENTS  322 (3d  ed.
2001).
102.  Beverly Neufeld, Editorial,  Finally,  Big Women  on Campus, N.Y.  TIMES,  Sept.  10, 2001,
at A28, available at LEXIS,  News Library, The New York Times File.
103.  See AMER,  supra note  100, at CRS-5.
2002]Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
States"l°04-represent  14.5%  of the population  and  hold  13.3%  of the
seats  in  parliament.1 0 5  In  South Africa,  the  white minority  represents
15%  of the population and a full 32% of the national legislature. 1 0 6
In  the 2000 election,  most women and  people  of color voted for the
losing  candidate  as  did  a majority  of all those  who  case ballots  in the
presidential race.  Despite our rhetorical  commitments  to majority rule,
a  candidate  favored  by  a  relatively  privileged  minority  became
President.  Certainly,  the  Supreme  Court's  decision  in  Bush v.  Gore
serves  as a continuing  reminder that some of the nation's most powerful
institutions  are  governed  by  disturbingly  elitist  principles.  However,
Bush v.  Gore is really just the tip of the iceberg  in this nation where,  in
stark  contrast  to  our  liberal,  democratic,  collective  self-image,  the
voices of those less privileged  are systematically discounted  and half of
the population does not vote at all.
The Supreme Court's role, albeit key, is not alone responsible for our
nation's  reliance  on  an  impoverished  conception  of  democracy
that  camouflages  widening  inequality.  After  all,  both  liberals  and
conservatives  manage  to justify  the idea of rule by an elite.  Their elite
is sometimes  differently  defined: it is  a meritocracy  for most liberals;  a
plutocracy for many  conservatives.  Yet, the end result  is  similar.  In  a
country  where  deep,  structural  inequalities  prevent  everyone  from
succeeding  on  tests  of  "knowledgeable  voting,"  the  importation  of
meritocracy  into  the  electoral  arena  fundamentally  undermines  the
values of democratic  participation. 107  As a result, those who are already
privileged  retain  their power,  and  egalitarian  terminology  increasingly
substitutes  for  meaningful  representation  or  popular  involvement  in
our  democratic  experiment.  It  is  to  these  meritocratic  justifications
underlying  the  disturbing  elitism  at  the  heart  of our  democracy  that  I
now turn.
104.  SUSAN  A.  BANDUCCI  ET  AL.,  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION,  EMPOWERMENT,  AND
PARTICIPATION  IN  NEW  ZEALAND  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  6  (rev.  ed.  1999),  available at
http://www.nzes.org/papers/wpsa99_revised.pdf  (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
105.  Visitor  Services,  Parliament,  Maori  Members  of  Parliament from  1868,  at
http://www.ps.parliament.govt.nz/educate/indexes/texts/maorimp.htm  (last  visited  Nov.  20,
2002).
106.  ANDREW  REYNOLDS  ET  AL.,  THE  INTERNATIONAL  IDEA  HANDBOOK  OF  ELECTORAL
DESIGN  70 (2d ed.  1997), at http://www.idea.int/esd/publications.cfm  (last  visited Oct.  19,  2002)
[hereinafter  IDEA HANDBOOK].
107.  In the aftermath  of the Florida debacle, there  was widespread contempt  in some quarters
for those low-income  or elderly voters  who  "lost their  votes  ...  because  of rotten ballot design.
The  elitists  said  if these  voters  were  too  dumb or  uneducated  to use  the equipment  right,  they
deserved to lose their ballots.  E.J. Dionne, D.C. Gives a Lesson in Voting, WASH.  POST, Sept.  17,
2002,  at A21, available  at 2002 WL  100082603.
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II.  RULE BY PRIVILEGE
On the presumption that they could discern  a merit-based  approach to
voting,  the  conservative  majority  stopped  the  recounting  of  votes  in
Florida.  During  oral  argument  in  Bush  v.  Gore, Justice  Sandra  Day
O'Connor  grilled  Al  Gore's  lawyer,  David  Boies,  about  what  vote-
counting  standard  could  properly  be used  in  terms  of determining  the
intent of the voter:  "Well, why  isn't the standard the one  that voters are
instructed  to follow, for goodness  sakes?  I mean,  it couldn't  be clearer.
I mean, why don't we go to that standard?" 1 0 8  As a result of the Court's
decision  to  stop  the  recount,  those  voters  who  were  unable  to  follow
"the  rules" simply  failed to file a legal vote  when  they cast their ballot.
Their  citizenship  rights  were  only  as  strong  as  their  county's  voting
machine's ability to discern their intent.
This  "merit-based"  approach  to  democracy-just  like  the  "merit-
based"  approach  to  admissions  in  other  institutions-systematically
privileges  wealthy,  white  Americans  over  poor  people  and  people  of
color.  The  Court found  in  1970,  for example,  that the  use  of tests  or
devices  to  "discern  merit"  can  perpetuate  racialized  inequities  in
educational opportunity;  they can and did also depress voter registration
and  participation  by  poor  whites.  Indeed,  the  Voting  Rights  Act  of
1965  explicitly  prohibited  the use of literacy  tests as  a precondition  to
voting, a ban extended  nationwide  in  1970 and  unanimously upheld  by
the Supreme Court.
1 09
The current  Court  seems  in  thrall  of the  illusion  that  merit  is  easily
testable  and  an  acceptable  basis  on  which  to  distribute  democratic
opportunity.  This  perception  is  consistent  with  the  story  the  term
meritocracy  was  designed  to tell.  The term  was  coined  in  1958  by  a
108.  Tr.  of Oral  Argument,  Dec.  11,  2000,  Bush  v. Gore,  531  U.S.  98 (2000)  (No.  00-949),
available at 2000 WL  1804429,  at *58.  Justice O'Connor's query  echoes the position of Joseph
Klock (the lawyer arguing  on behalf of Florida Secretary  of State Katherine  Harris).  Responding
to Justice Souter's question  about  what a uniform  standard  would be  for counting  ballots,  Klock
said:
I'll  try  to  answer  that  question.  You  would  start,  I  would  believe,  with  the
requirements that the voter has when they go  into the  booth.  That would be  a standard
to start  with.  The voter is  told in  the  polling place and  then  when they  walk  into the
booth that what you are supposed to do with respect to the punch cards,  is put the ballot
in,  punch  your  selections,  take  the  ballot  out,  and  make  sure  there  are  no  hanging
pieces of paper  attached  to it.  The whole issue of what constitutes  a legal vote,  which
the Democrats  make  much  ado  about,  presumes that  it's a  legal  vote  no matter  what
you do  with the card.  And presumably,  you could take the card out of the polling place
and not stick it in the box and they would consider that to  be a legal  vote.
Id. at *28-29.
109.  Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.  112 (1970).
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British  sociologist,  writing  a  parody  of  privilege  and  power." l 0  A
meritocracy  was  a  device  by  which  those  who  already  had  power
defined  a  system  that  enabled  them  to  retain  their  status, encouraging
the winners to believe they earned their victory and the losers to believe
that  they  too  deserved their  lot in life.1 11  Admissions to elite  colleges
are  a  perfect  example:  although  the  original  application  of  the
meritocracy  concept to the college admissions process  was done in the
name of extending  access  to  students  beyond  the confines  of the  New
England  private preparatory  schools,  it,  too, has  become  a vehicle  for
codifying  and  camouflaging  social  hierarchy. 112   Our  preoccupation
with  meritocracy  has  become  a  preoccupation  with  the  sorting-and-
ranking  behavior that  awards  scarce  places  in higher  education  on  the
basis of timed tests that favor those possessing the resources  to prepare
for the test.113  The resulting test scores become the building blocks of a
testocracy,  and  are  then  deemed  the  most  important  evidence  of  an
individual's visible, rankable worth or "merit." ' 114
Still,  within  each  race  and  ethnic  group,  aptitude  test  scores  rise
substantially  with  parental  income. 115   When  public  institutions  use
"merit-based"  tests  to  allocate  democratic  opportunity,  those  already
privileged benefit the most.  At the University  of California at Berkeley,
for  example,  in  1997,  42%  of the white  freshman  came  from families
who  earned  more  than  $100,000  a  year,  even  though  this  is  a  public
institution  financed  by  all  taxpayers. 116  At  the  University  of Texas,
when  a standardized  test-centered approach  determined admission, 75%
of the freshman class  came from  10%  of the state's  1500 high schools.
The  middle-  and  upper middle-class  suburban  high  schools dominated
110.  MICHAEL  YOUNG,  THE  RISEOF THE MERITOCRACY  1870-2033 (1958).
111.  Id.
112.  NICHOLAS  LEMANN,  THE BIG TEST 343-50 (1999).
113.  Indeed,  these standardized  test scores  tend  to  correlate better  with parental  income  (and
even grandparents'  socioeconomic  status)  than  actual student performance  in college or graduate
school.  See  Susan  Sturm  &  Lani  Guinier,  The  Future of Affirmative  Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL.  L. REV.  953, 987-92 (1996).
114.  The  term  "testocracy"  highlights  the  ways  in  which  selection  policies  are  heavily
dependent  on standardized aptitude testing.  See id. at 968.  "Testocracy"  "refer[s]  to test-centered
efforts to  score  applicants, rank them comparatively,  and then predict their  future performance."
Id.  However,  in  this  Essay,  I  limit  the  discussion  of testing  to  aptitude  tests  (as  opposed  to
achievement  tests).
115.  Id. at989.
116.  See  Mindy  Kornhaber,  Reconfiguring  Admissions  to  Serve  the  Mission  of  Selective
Public  Higher Education  (January  14,  1999)  (unpublished  typescript,  on  file  with  author).  In
1997,  nearly  42% of white  freshman  at Berkeley had  parental  incomes over $100,000  a year,  as
did 27% of Asians.  Id.  In contrast,  14%  of African-Americans  and  10% of Chicanos had family
incomes at that level.  Id.
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the  admissions  process  at  Texas'  public  universities  and  some  poor,
predominantly  white  rural  counties  did  not  send  a  single  resident  to
either of the state's two flagship schools.  The use of standardized  tests,
in other words, disadvantages  poor whites as well as blacks and Latinos.
When the admissions process  strongly favors  white,  upper middle-class
students,  very  few  of  whom  pursue  careers  devoted  to  the  public
interest,  it is  not surprising  that  the new  meritocracy  breeds resentment
among those who  are excluded.1 7  What is surprising,  however, is  that
despite  significant  evidence  that  aptitude  tests  fail  to  predict anything
beyond  first-year  college  grades  (and  even  then  the  relationship  is
extremely  modest),  an  array  of explanations  justifies  the exclusion  of
those who do not do as well on  what have become  'class-based'  criteria
for determining merit.  In fact, studies  show that the aptitude  tests more
accurately  measure parental  socioeconomic  status than first-year college
grades. 118
This  phenomenon  of  normalizing  inequitable  outcomes  applies  in
politics  as  well.  Tracking  conventional  forms  of  "meritocratic"
selection,  the  baseline  for  "admission"  is  a  single  uniform  standard.
The  only  difference  is  whether  the  applicant's  performance,  as
measured by that standard, entitles  her to admission to college or deems
her  capable  of  casting  a  legal  vote.  Such  a  standard  purports  to  be
objective  and  fair  in  identifying  who  deserves  admission.  Just  as
entrance  to  highly  selective  colleges  is  supposedly  based  on  visible,
rankable  merit, participation in a democracy becomes  synonymous  with
measurable  ability-arbitrarily  evaluated  at  the  micro  level  of  ballot
counting not ballot voting-to cast a "legal vote."
But  as  the  2000  election  made  painfully  clear,  such  purportedly
merit-based  tests  contain  a bias  toward  existing  privilege, which  has  a
117.  As  it has evolved, the notion of contributing  to the community  has also taken  a back seat
in the equation.  Many of those  admitted based on their test scores come to believe that their  merit
justifies  their  continued  privilege.  Thus,  they  are  not  burdened  even  by  notions  of  noblesse
oblige  in terms of public service,  self-sacrifice  for the  common  good,  or acts  of public charity.
Indeed,  59.8%  of  college  students  cite  the  "likelihood  of making  money"  as  a  very  effective
motivating  factor,  whereas  only  38.6%  are  motivated  by  opportunities  to  "give  back  to  the
community."  INST. OF  POLITICS,  HARVARD  UNIV.,  ATTITUDES  TOWARD  POLITICS AND  PUBLIC
SERVICE:  A  NATIONAL  SURVEY  OF  COLLEGE  UNDERGRADUATES:  TOP  LINE  DATA  4  (2000),
available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/iop/survey-data.pdf  (last visited Nov.  26, 2002).
118.  Sturm  &  Guinier,  supra  note  113,  at  971-72.  The  correlation  between  aptitude  test
scores  and  parental  income  should  not  surprise  us,  given  the  role  that  high-priced  coaching
techniques play  in raising  test scores.  Id. at 991.  But what  may surprise  some  is just  how weak
the  relationship  is  between  high  test scores  and  what  the  tests claim  to  predict  (i.e.,  first year
college  or  law  school  grades).  Id.  Studies  suggest  that nationwide  the  aptitude  test  for  law
schools (LSAT)  is between 9%  and  14%  better than random  in predicting  first year grades.  Id. at
971.
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major  impact  at  the earliest  stage  of the  voting  process-at  the ballot
box.  Rules  that  limit time  in  the  voting  booth  to  five  minutes  even
when  ballots  are  long  and  complex,  fail  to  provide  adequate  help  to
illiterate  voters,  and deny voters  a chance to cast  a ballot for their first
choice  candidate,  without jeopardizing  their second  choice  candidate's
election,  all  combine  to  privilege  participation  by  the  better-educated
members  of the electorate.  Presumably  fair and objective,  these  voting
rules  define  the  "legitimate"  or  deserving  voters,  restricting  ballot
access  to those who are educated,  and for that matter, who can afford to
take  time  off from  work  to vote.  Yet, this  inequality  in  access  to the
ballot is apparently constitutionally  irrelevant, while inequality during a
recount  is  dispositive  evidence  of  a  constitutional  violation.  Even
worse,  in  Florida  and  many  other  states,  disparate  ballot  technology
makes  the voting process  the most complicated  for the poorest and least
well-educated  members  of  society,  especially  those  who  are  also
descendants of slaves or treated as such.
The  racial  effects  of applying  a  so-called  merit-based  approach  to
voting  in Florida  were  striking:  automatic  machines  rejected  14.4%  of
ballots  cast  by  African-Americans,  but  only  1.6%  of  ballots  cast  by
others.1 19  Although blacks made  up  16%  of the voting population, they
cast  54%  of the  machine-rejected  ballots. 12   Ballots  cast by  African-
Americans  were almost ten times more likely than the ballots of whites
to be rejected. 121  Furthermore,  counting  machines  rejected  punch card
ballots  in  predominantly  African-American  precincts  in  Miami-Dade
County  at  twice  the  rate  they  rejected  ballots  in  predominantly
Latino  precincts,  and  four  times  the  rate  they  rejected  ballots  in
predominantly  white  precincts. 122   Black  precincts  also  lacked  the
119.  See  Katharine  Q.  Seelye,  Divided Civil Rights Panel Approves Election Report, N.Y.
TIMES,  June  9,  2001,  at  A8,  available at LEXIS,  News  Library,  The  New  York  Times  File
(reporting  on a study conducted by Allan J. Lichtman, a history professor at American University
and  an  elections  expert);  see also U.S.  to Look  into Possible Irregularities  at the Polls, CHI.
TRIB.,  Dec.  4,  2000,  §  1,  at  9,  available at  2000  WL  29782894  [hereinafter  Possible
Irregularities  at the Polls] ("The Washington  Post reported Sunday  that a computer  analysis had
found  that  the  more  black  and  Democratic  a  precinct,  the  more  likely  a  high  number  of
presidential  votes  was not counted.").
120.  See U.S.  COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS,  VOTING  IRREGULARITIES  IN  FLORIDA  DURING THE
2000  PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2  (2001).
121.  See id.
122.  See Josh  Barbanel  & Ford Fessenden,  Racial Pattern in Demographics of Error-Prone
Ballots, N.Y.  TIMES, Nov.  29, 2000, at A25,  available at LEXIS, News  Library, The New York
Times  File.  The potential  magnitude  of the difference  in technology  "is  evident in  Miami-Dade
County,  where  predominantly  black  precincts  saw  their  votes  thrown  out  at  twice  the  rate  as
Hispanic  precincts  and nearly four times the rate  of white  precincts.  In all,  1 out of  11  ballots  in
predominantly  black  precincts were  rejected,  a total of 9,904."  Id.  Moreover, "64  percent of the
state's black  voters live  in counties that used  the punch  cards  while 56  percent of whites did  so."
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technology  that  helped  handle  overflow  crowds  in  white  and  some
Latino  (Cuban/Republican)  precincts.  Compounding  the problem  were
flaws in the registration  lists and  state law prohibiting from voting those
who have  served their time in prison and repaid  their debt to society. 123
Researchers  estimate that if Florida did not disenfranchise  over 200,000
felons and over 500,000 ex-felons, Gore  would have carried the state by
some 80,000 to 90,000 votes. 124
Indeed,  this  merit-based  approach  to  ballot  counting  (that  ignores
blatant  inequities  in  access  to  the  act  of  voting  itself)  is  hauntingly
reminiscent  of  devices,  like  literacy  tests  and  grandfather  clauses,
imposed  systematically  throughout  the South  following  Reconstruction
to  disenfranchise  black  voters. 125   Just  as  in the Jim  Crow  South,  the
realities  of Florida  balloting  demonstrate  that,  despite  its  purported
objectivity,  this  merit-based  approach  primarily  benefits  those
already  enjoying  power.  While  obsessing  about  partisan  motives  that
potentially  compromise  the integrity  of the ballot,  the proponents  of a
merit-based  system  elevate  concerns  about  fraud  over  concerns  about
participation.  In the name of "ballot integrity,"  the legacy  of race-based
disenfranchisement  continues  to haunt our nation.
The  rhetoric  of  meritocracy  also  undermines  the  capacity  of those
who  have  been  disenfranchised  to  organize  for  change.  The  populist
promise  of  this  rhetoric  is  cabined  by  a  commitment  to  election
structures  that  discourage  grassroots  collective  action  and  dissuade
Id.; see Possible Irregularities  at the Polls, supra note  119  ("In  Miami-Dade,  the  state's  most
populous  county,  about  3  percent  of  ballots  were  excluded  from  the  presidential  tally.  But  in
precincts  with  a black  population  of 70  percent or  more, about  10 percent  were  not counted.");
Kim  Cobb,  Black Leaders  Want Action  on  Florida Vote  Complaints, HOUS.  CHRON.,  Nov. 30,
2000, at A24, available at 2000 WL 24530801  ("U.S.  Rep.  Corrine  Brown, D-Jacksonville,  said
that  16,000 of the 27,000 ballots  left uncounted  in Duval  County  were from predominantly  black
precincts.").  But see  Stephen  Ansolabehere,  Voting Machines, Race, and Equal Protection, 1
ELECTION  L.J.  61  (2002)  (arguing  that  nationally,  no  significant  correlation  exists between  race
and  punch  card  machine-rejected  ballots,  and  that  racial  disparities  are  explained  by  a  higher
percentage  of less  reliable  punch  card  technology  in  African-American  precincts).  By  contrast,
the  voices  of  certain  groups  of  (primarily  Republican)  voters  received  preferential  counting
treatment.  A  complicated  political  and  legal  strategy  helped  ensure  that  canvassing  boards
accepted  41%  of flawed  absentee  military  ballots  compared  to 30%  of flawed absentee  civilian
ballots.  David  Barstow  &  Don  Van  Natta, Jr.,  How Bush  Took  Florida: Mining the Overseas
Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July  15,  2001,  § 1, at 1, available  at LEXIS,  News Library, The New
York Times File.
123.  Mireya  Navarro  &  Somini  Sengupta, Arriving at Florida Voting  Places, Some  Blacks
Found Frustration,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Nov.  30,  2000, at Al, available at LEXIS,  News  Library, The
New  York  Times  File;  see  also  Gregory  Palast,  Florida's  "Disappeared  Voters":
Disenfranchised  by the GOP,  NATION, Feb.  5, 2001,  at 20 (describing  the flawed lists used by the
state to purge  a disproportionate  number of blacks in Florida).
124.  SIMSON,  supra  note 77, at 33.
125.  Id. at  16.
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multiracial political activity by organized groups.  As Professor Overton
notes,  "[a]lthough  the Court's facially  neutral  merit-based  criteria focus
on individual responsibility,  they interfere  primarily  not with individual
rights, but with the ability of groups of voters like African-Americans to
identify  with one  another  as  a political  community,  to  create  alliances
with  others  of  different  backgrounds,  and  to  use  the  vote  to  enact
political change."'
126
But, no matter:  in Bush v. Gore, the conservative  majority continues
to see voting  as an individual  right and reminds us that "[t]he individual
citizen  has  no  federal  constitutional  right  to  vote  for  electors  for  the
President  of  the  United  States  unless  and  until  the  state  legislature
chooses  a  statewide  election  as  the  means  to  implement  its  power  to
appoint  members  of the  electoral  college." 127   While  the  state  cannot
overtly  fence  out  a  group  of  voters  to  arbitrarily  deny  them  an
opportunity  to cast their ballots, the state  may establish voting rules that
covertly  accomplish the  same exclusion. 128  This means that those who
are functionally  illiterate  (as  are  more  than forty  million  adults  in  this
country)129  or  who  live  in  poor  counties,  without  access  to  the
technology necessary to confirm registration  status and ease  lines at the
polling place,  simply do not enjoy the same "ability"  to cast legal votes.
Even  when  such  citizens  manage  to cast their ballots-because  of the
vagaries  of  state  law,  antiquated  voting  technology,  as  well  as  the
126.  Overton,  supra note 49,  at 473.  I thank  Professor Overton  for his  insightful  analysis of
the  way that conventions of meritocracy  apparently informed the Court's analysis:  "Bush v. Gore
rejected  the  more inclusionary  assumptions  about  democracy  articulated  in other cases,  but...
the  Court  embraced  merit-based  assumptions  that  conditioned  political  recognition  on  an
individual  voter's  capacity to produce a machine-readable  ballot."  Id. at 472; see also Pamela S.
Karlan,  Nothing Personal: The  Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection  from Shaw  v. Reno  to
Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REv.  1345,  1365  (2001)  ("There is  credible evidence that systems that
disproportionately  reject votes  both have a racially disparate  impact and are  more  often used  in
the  populous jurisdictions  in which  minority  voters  are  concentrated.  Thus,  the  newest  equal
protection  once  again  vindicates  the  interests  of  middle-class,  politically  potent  voters,  while
ignoring the interests of the clause's original beneficiaries.").
127.  Bush  v.  Gore,  531  U.S.  98,  104  (2000)  (per  curiam).  Citizens  have  no  federally
mandated or constitutionally  sacrosanct  right to vote.  It is up  to the  various  state legislatures  to
determine  whether  to vest the  right to vote  in the  people,  and  only then  does  the right  become
fundamental  and  protected  based  on  rights  to  equal  protection.  Id.  (per  curiam).  This
requirement  means  that the rights of voters  are only triggered once the  ballot is  made available;
when  the  state accedes  to allow  voters  to vote,  then it is up to the state  to establish  the  rules for
voting so that a ballot is in fact tabulated.  Id. (per curiam).
128.  "[O]nce  the  franchise  is  granted  to  the  electorate,  lines  may  not be  drawn  which  are
inconsistent  with  the Equal  Protection  Clause of the  Fourteenth  Amendment."  Id. at  105  (per
curiam) (quoting Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,  383 U.S.  663, 665 (1966)).
129.  For detailed analysis  and  statistics  about illiteracy  in the  United States,  see  the National
Institute  for  Literacy's  website  at  http://novel.nifl.gov/nifl/faqs.html#literacy%20rates  (last
visited Nov.  20, 2002).
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delegation  of  enormous  discretion  to  local  polling  officials-some
citizens'  votes are still not counted.
III.  RECONCEPTUALIZING  DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
A  survey  released  December  7,  2000,  by  the  Harvard  Vanishing
Voter  Project  indicated  that  large  majorities  of  the  American  people
believed the election procedures  had been "unfair  to the voters." 130  Not
surprisingly,  nationwide, those most  likely to feel disenfranchised  were
blacks.  Moreover,  one out of ten blacks  reported  that they or someone
in  their  family  had  trouble  voting,  according  to  a  national  report
produced by Michael Dawson  and Lawrence  Bobo of the Center for the
Study  of Race,  Politics  and  Culture  and  the W.E.B.  Dubois Institute.
The alienation  of the black community was  also evident in the reaction
of  the  Congressional  Black  Caucus,  which  alone  raised  formal
objections  in  the  House  of Representatives  to  Florida's  slate  of Bush
electors.  In  a  poignant  column  for  the  Boston  Globe, James  Carroll
asked:  "What  does  it  say  that  even  the  most  left-wing  of  white
congressmen  and  senators  have  adjusted themselves  to the problematic
Bush election,  while  the Congressional  Black Caucus  has  not?"131  He
concluded,  "Those  who  sit  atop  the  social  and  economic  pyramid
always  speak  of  love,  while  those  at  the  bottom  always  speak  of
justice."'
132
One thing is certain to those of us who have  studied the structure, not
just the mechanics,  of our election system:  reforms for the tabulation of
ballots  alone  will  not  resolve  the  deep  alienation  that  pervades  our
democracy  and  causes  people  to not even  vote.  Turnout in  2000  was
up  in  Florida  and  other  contested  states,  primarily  as  a  result  of
grassroots  efforts  to  increase  participation.  In  Election  2000,  for
example,  members  of  union  households  (13%  of  the  workforce)
were  more  likely  to  vote  and  to  also  vote  Democratic. 133   The key
explanatory  factor  was  not  the  political  preferences  of  union  leaders
who  announced  early  for Gore.  It was  the grassroots  organizing  of the
130.  Press Release,  The Vanishing  Voter, The  Joan Shorenstein  Center on the  Press, Politics
and  Public  Policy  at John F.  Kennedy  School of Government,  Harvard  University,  As  Election
Contest  Drags  On,  Americans'  Dissatisfaction  Grows  (Dec.  7,  2000),  available  at
http://www.vanishingvoter.org/releases/12-07-00.shtml  (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
131.  James  Carroll, Editorial,  Black Caucus Sends a Message About Justice, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 9,  2001,  at A19, available  at 2001  WL 3914134.
132.  Id.
133.  University  of Delaware, Exit Poll Results-Election 2000, at http://www.udel.edu/poscir/
road/course/exitpollsindex.html  (last visited Nov.  20, 2002).  This statistic also demonstrates  that
people  in  unions  have  higher  turnout  rates  because  union  members  represent  16%  of  the
electorate, whereas they represent only  13%  of the adult population.  See id.
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rank and file.134  But a report from  the Committee  for the Study of the
American  Electorate  ("CSAE"),  a  nonprofit  research  organization,
suggested  that  such  efforts  will  not  increase  turnout  in  future
elections. 135  As more  and more power gravitates  to  a permanent  set  of
political elites,  a  process that  discourages  their active involvement  has
increasingly marginalized many Americans.
Last  year,  the  registration  of Democrats  continued  a  thirty-six-year
decline  and  registration  for  third  parties  and  independents  streamed
upward.  Upgrading  voting  equipment  and  creating  uniform  ballot
counting  procedures  will  not  do  much  to  alter  these  demographic
changes,  which  suggest  the  withdrawal  of  many  citizens  from  our
current  two-party  system.  "The  root  of  the  turnout  problem  is
motivational"  and  not  technical,  the  CSAE  report  said.136   In  other
words,  the  skewed  incentive  structure  of  our  current  two  party
duopoly-with  its  candidate-centered,  elite  driven  set  of  rules-
discourages  a  large  number  of  people  from participating  in  the  most
basic aspects of our political process.
It is  the political process  itself that needs fixing.  On this point, John
Dewey  had  it  exactly  right:  "[t]he  cure  for  ailments  in  democracy  is
more  democracy." 137   We  need  to  imagine  systems  that  encourage
greater  levels  of voter  participation,  that  lead  to  a  higher  degree  of
confidence  in election  results  and the related policy outcomes,  and that
encourage  ordinary  citizens  to join together  more effectively  to  play  a
role  in the process of self-government  beyond just voting.  Indeed,  we
might  jumpstart  a  different  kind  of  conversation  by  examining  the
systems adopted by other mature democracies  as well as those countries
that had the benefit of building on other's mistakes.
For  example,  a  1995  survey  of  twenty  industrialized  democracies
revealed  a  number  of practices  other  countries  have  implemented  to
restrict  the  role of private  money  in legislative  elections.  Canada  and
Great Britain,  for instance,  both  limit legislative  candidates'  campaign
spending  to  under  $25,000.138  Perhaps  more  practically,  the  United
134.  For  a  sample  discussion  of  some  of  these  grassroots  union  activities  in  the  last  two
elections,  see  AFL-CIO,  Election Day Difference-New  Working  Family Voters!!  (2000),  at
http://www.aflcio.org/news/2000/1026_voterreg.htm  (last visited Nov.  20, 2002),  and AFL-CIO,
Labor '98 Mobilized Members Around Working Family Issues (1998),  at http://www.aflcio.org/
labor98/mobil.htm (last visit Nov. 20, 2002).
135.  Voter Turnout Rose in 2000, But No Lasting Impact Is Seen, N.Y.  TIMES,  Aug. 31,  2001,
at A12, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New  York Times File.
136.  Id.
137.  John Dewey, quoted in MORONE,  supra note  19, at 322.
138.  Steven  Hill,  For Campaign Finance Laws  that Work,  Look Abroad, CHRISTIAN  SCI.
MONITOR,  Feb. 28,  1995, at  19.
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States  could  follow  other  democracies  in  providing  greater  public
financing  of elections  and  requiring  media  organizations  to  provide
equal,  free  advertising  access.  It  is  worth  noting  that  fifteen  of the
twenty  democracies  surveyed  "prohibit  paid political  advertisements  as
a  way  of keeping  the  playing  field  even." 139  A  comparative  analysis
also  supplies  insights  to revitalize  American  democracy  in  other areas.
Turnout could  be increased  by  voting on  a weekend  or  holiday  rather
than a  workday, 1 4  as  most democracies  do,  and weighing  the benefits
of mandatory  voting, 14 1 as  a  few countries  have.  The  most  important
lesson  other  countries  have  to  teach  the  United  States,  however,
involves changing  our electoral  system to promote the political  efficacy
of local grassroots organizations.
Before  describing  a range  of comparative  examples  that might  help
inspire  a  broad,  multiracial  and  progressive  coalition  committed  to
reviving American  democracy,  let  me  set forth  several  assumptions  on
which  this  exploration  proceeds.  First,  blacks  already  possess  a high
level  of  group  consciousness  and  understand  many  of  the  systemic
biases  that render the country  more  oligarchic  than  meritocratic,  which
means  they  must play  an  active  role  for any  pro-democracy  movement
to be successful.  However, this  movement would obviously  also reach
out to other people of color, poor whites,  young people, organized labor
and, of course, other potential allies such as the middle- and upper-class
progressives  that  currently  form  the backbone  of the  Green  Party.  Its
members  would  be identified  by  their politics  and  their willingness  to
link their fate to those currently most disadvantaged.
Second,  a  pro-democracy  movement  might  start  with  basic  reforms
such  as  twenty-four  hour voting  on  a national  holiday,  but it  must  not
stop there.  Uniform  national  standards,  imposed top-down,  do little to
change the incentive structure  for participation.  Giving people  a reason
to vote is by far the most vital element of a democracy movement.  Still,
merely  voting  is  not  even  enough.  People  need  to  be  given
opportunities to participate and contribute  between elections in order for
the  seeds  of  meaningful  democratic  change  to  take  root.  Such
opportunities  require  intermediate  institutions  that  help  educate,
organize,  and  mobilize  grassroots  involvement  in  the  conversation  of
democracy.
139.  Id.
140.  Indeed, the recent  Electoral  Reform  Commission chaired  by former  Presidents  Ford and
Carter proposed just such a reform.
141.  While  this  may  initially  seem  to  violate  personal  autonomy,  it  is  not  a  greater  civic
burden  than, for instance,  requiring eighteen-year-old-males  to register for the draft.
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Finally,  the  short-term  prospects  for  fundamentally  transforming
American  politics  along  the  lines  I  outline  below  are  admittedly  quite
low.  The  recent  experience  of  the  Greens  suggests  that  without
structural  changes  in  our  winner-take-all  rules,  it  is  difficult  to  field
candidates  at the  national  level  who  will  alter  the debate  and  gain  an
institutional foothold in the forums of representative  democracy.  Many
third  parties  have  tried  and  failed  to  become  legitimate  contenders  in
American  politics  over  the  last  hundred  years.  On  the  other  hand,
alternative  strategies  for advancing  a progressive political  agenda  have
also  failed  in  the electoral  arena where  efforts  to move the Democratic
Party leftwards  have often had the opposite effect.
1 42
Therefore,  the goal of this thought experiment is  much more modest.
I  hope  simply  to demonstrate  once  again just how  poorly  the  country
currently represents  the interests of poor and working-class  people of all
races-both by  normative  and comparative  standards.  With that lesson
in mind,  committed  reformers  working  in various  institutional  settings
could  redouble  their  efforts  to learn  from  the experience  of people  of
color in order to effect the fundamental change  necessary to provide all
Americans  with  equitable  political  and  social  citizenship.  Here  are
three approaches  to re-invigorate,  at  the very least,  a deeper  discussion
of the failings of our democracy  so that the reforms pursued in the wake
of Election  2000  go  beyond  cosmetic  changes  merely  involving  the
mechanics  of voting.
A.  The Emergence of Grassroots  and Locally-Based Parties
First,  a  new  party  could  seek  political  influence  to  mobilize  and
organize  at  the  grassroots  level  rather  than  to  start  out  as  a  force  in
national politics.  What  might set such a new political party apart from
past  attempts  along  these  lines  is  if  it  were  to  begin  by  (1)  fielding
candidates  primarily  in  majority-minority  districts  and  then  (2)
organizing  a  new  political  movement  based  on  the  experiences  and
interests of people of color and other under-represented  groups.'43  Such
a strategy would have real potential if the party persuaded at least some
142.  Joel  Rogers,  The New  Party-Now More than Ever: Rogers Replies, 18  BOSTON  REV.
(Jan.-Feb.  1993),  available at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BRl8.1/revive.html  (last visited  Nov.
20,  2002).  On  the  other hand,  it  might be  useful  to  study the  example  of the  Christian  Right,
which started at the grassroots  level, gradually got elected to school  boards and city councils  and
developed  a  much  louder  voice  within  the  Republican  Party  precisely  because  they  provided
important local organizing to win elections.
143.  An  interesting  side  note  is  that,  according  to  the  Supreme  Court's  current,  confused
jurisprudence regarding  majority-minority  districts,  the  new  party could  seek to draw majority-
minority  districts  more  easily  than  the  traditional  parties  because  it  would  clearly  be  doing so
primarily for political  rather than racial motives.  See Easely v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
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of the  current  (Democratic)  representatives  of these  districts  to switch
party  affiliation.  The feelings  of profound  alienation  voiced  by  many
black  and  Latino  elected  officials-even  in  relation  to  their  fellow
Democrats-suggests  this  is  not  an  entirely  implausible  scenario. 144
Moreover,  as  the  example  of  the  British  Labour  Party  proves,
progressive  third  parties  can  achieve  electoral  breakthroughs  even  in
winner-take-all  electoral systems such as ours.
In  the  late  1800s,  two  parties,  the  Conservatives  and  the  Liberals,
dominated  British politics. 1 45  The Liberals  were  the more  progressive
of the two parties, and they had enjoyed  strong union support as well  as
the electoral  backing of most workers.  However,  by the early years  of
the  new  century,  many  union  activists  became  dissatisfied  by  their
inability  to influence the Liberal platform  to any significant degree, and
they decided to form a new Labour Party.
The  Labour  Party  wisely  coordinated  its  efforts  closely  with  the
Liberals in its early  years.  Eager not to divide the "progressive"  vote in
Britain's electoral system  that, like our own, is based on single-member
plurality district elections,  the Liberals gave Labour a free  hand against
the Conservatives  in a number of constituencies.  By  1910, Labour won
6%  of the  nationwide  vote  and  forty  seats  in  the House  of Commons.
The  Labour  Party  gained  more  and  more  votes  as  Britain's  political
structure  continued  to  be  transformed  in  the  wake  of technological
advancement,  social  movements,  and  the dislocations  and  reforms  that
resulted  from  two  world  wars.  Within  a  half century  of  its  creation,
Labour  stormed  to  an  impressive  electoral  victory  that  allowed  it  to
implement dramatic  sociopolitical reforms.
The experience  of British Labour  is far from unusual  internationally.
Indeed,  although  a  number  of  countries  conduct  elections  based
144.  As  described above,  it is  often  the  black elected  officials  who  stand  alone  to  protest
obvious  injustices,  while  their  white  Democratic  colleagues,  though  sympathetic,  sit  back,
constrained  to follow the rules.  Carroll, supra note  131.  There is great potential  for a  third party
with roots in majority-black districts since so many  members of the Congressional Black Caucus
already  serve  as  caseworkers  for members  of marginalized  communities  in  general  rather than
simply  the  district from  which  they  are  elected.  For instance,  in  1995,  a full 30%  of all  calls
seeking  assistance  from Congresswoman  Cynthia  McKinney of Georgia  came  from  individuals
outside her district, and  80% of these persons were  "low-income  minority individuals."  Lisa A.
Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent Community in  the Post-Shaw Era, 49
VAND.  L. REv.,  227, 284 n.179 (1996).
145.  There  is  a  rich  literature  that  analyzes  the  rise  of the  British  Labour  Party.  Readers
interested  in  exploring  this  topic  in  greater  detail  might  consult  the  following:  GREGORY
LUEBBERT,  LIBERALISM,  FASCISM  OR  SOCIAL  DEMOCRACY  (1991);  HENRY  PELLING,  THE
ORIGINS  OF  THE LABOUR  PARTY  1880-1900 (1965);  MARTIN  PUGH,  THE MAKING  OF  MODERN
BRITISH  POLITICS,  1867-1939 (1993);  DUNCAN  TANNER,  POLITICAL  CHANGE  AND  THE LABOUR
PARTY,  1900-1918 (1990).
2002]Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
on  winner-take-all  districts,  G.  Bingham  Powell,  Jr.,  reported  in  his
comparative  study  of  twenty  industrialized  democracies  that  the
complete  two-party  dominance  in the United  States is unique.  "[O]nly
in  the United  States  did  the two largest  parties  consistently  win  more
than  90  percent  of  the  vote  in  legislative  elections." 146   While  the
Supreme  Court  decisions  mentioned  in  Part  I  of  this  Essay  place
additional  barriers  on  the  formation  of  politically  significant  third
parties in the United States, they certainly  do not create insurmountable
obstacles.  In  the  mid-1960s---despite  tremendous  legal  and  political
discrimination-the  Mississippi  Freedom  Democratic  Party  mounted
an  impressive  challenge  to  the  Democrats  and  Republicans.  This
progressive  party,  dedicated  to promoting  the  full citizenship  rights  of
black Americans,  fielded  candidates  in  elections  for  the  United  States
Congress  who  won  the  support  of  a  majority  of  black  voters. 147
Imagine the  potential  such  a party  could  have  now  with  the  advent  of
majority-minority  districts.
However,  another  equally  important  question  remains.  Even  if  a
progressive  party  were  to overcome  the  admittedly  significant  barriers
to  entry  in  our current political  system  and  won  as  many  as  say  two
dozen  seats in Congress,  could it really have enough influence to foster
significant  advancements  in  social  and  political  citizenship  in  this
country?  There  are  at  least  three  reasons  why  the  answer  might
be  a  plausible  yes.  First,  a  political  organizing  effort  that  began  in
communities  of color could  track other cultural  cross-over movements
to give voice to the extreme alienation of the poor  and young voters  of
all  races  who  care  little  about  the  major  issues  emphasized  in  recent
campaigns,  such  as  tax  relief  for  the  middle  and  upper  classes  and
prescription  drug  plans  for  the  elderly.  As  Mary  Eakle,  25,  a  $7-an-
hour assistant  deli manager  put it during the  2000 presidential  contest:
"None  of  what  they're  saying  is  about  us." 148   Local  political
organizations,  developed  in  conjunction  with  issues  of concern  in  the
community,  would encourage  participation  through local forums,  door-
knocking campaigns,  and face-to-face  contact  on  issues  of concern  as
defined by the people in the communities themselves.
146.  G.  BINGHAM  POWELL,  JR.,  ELECTIONS  AS  INSTRUMENTS  OF  DEMOCRACY:
MAJORITARIAN  AND  PROPORTIONAL  VISIONS  90  (2000);  see  also id. at 28-29  (describing  how
the number  of parties  winning  votes  generally  declines  in countries  with  single-member  election
rules).
147.  Dan Nicolai, The Law  and the Struggle  for the Soul of the Democratic  Party 26 (Dec. 20,
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
148.  Dale Russakoff, Cut Out of Prosperity, Cutting Out at the Polls, WASH.  POST, Oct.  24,
2000, at Al,  available  at 2000 WL 25424189; see also Dale Russakoff,  Young  Voters See Little
in It for Them, WASH.  POST, Nov.  2, 2000, at A1,  available  at 2000 WL 25425871.
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Second,  the  party  could  use  municipalities,  counties,  or even  states
where  it  gained  sufficient  influence  as  laboratories  of  democracy  in
promoting  individuals'  social  and  political  rights  through  the
implementation  of policies  ranging from  a living wage  to proportional
representation.  Successful  experiments  would  serve  as  models  and
encourage  the  two  major  parties  to  promulgate  similar  national  (or
statewide)  reforms.  The  experience  of Canada's  National  Democratic
Party ("NDP")-the country's  only  significant  party  advocating  social
democracy-teaches  relevant  lessons  in  this  respect.  While  never
winning  more  than  20%  of  the  vote  in  a  federal  election,  NDP
provincial  governments  implemented progressive  labor  and  health  care
reforms  that  were  so  popular  that  the  federal  government  eventually
extended their basic principles throughout the nation.  This example was
most notably the case  in the development of Canada's  universal,  single-
payer  health  care  system,  which  was  first  promulgated  by  the  NDP
provincial government of Saskatchewan. 149
Third,  the existence  of  a locally-initiated  third  party might  pressure
the  Democratic  Party  to  advocate  more  progressive  policies  because
Democrats  would  no longer be able  to take  the support of black  voters
for granted. 15   However,  the experience  of the initial  alliance between
the  Liberals  and  Labour  in  Britain  suggested  that  local,  progressive
political  parties  would  have  to  work  with,  rather  than  against,  the
Democrats.  Such  a  strategy  would avoid  splitting the black,  brown  or
progressive vote and throwing elections  to conservative  Republicans-a
danger  few  are  likely  to  underestimate  after  the  2000  presidential
election. 151
149.  Peter Dreier & Elaine Bernard, Kinder, Gentler Canada,  AM.  PROSPECT, Winter  1993,  at
85, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V4/12/dreier-p.html  (last  visited  Nov.  20,  2002);
see also Elaine Bernard,  The Difference a New  Party Would Make,  18  BOSTON  REV.  (Jan.-Feb.
1993),  available at http://bostonreview.mit.edu.BR18.1/revive.html  (last  visited  Nov.  20,  2002).
Bernard's  piece  is  in  the  context  of  a series  of articles  about  the  New  Party,  a political  party
founded  in  the  early  1990s  and  with  quite  similar  goals  to  the  objectives  of  the  hypothetical
Progressive  Party.  In  my  view,  a  crucial  difference  is  that  the  New  Party-while  clearly
demonstrating  an  admirable  interest  in  racial justice and  working  with black elected  officials-
does  not  focus  to the same  degree  on  the grassroots  involvement  of poor  people of color as  the
Progressive  Party would.  Nevertheless,  the  New  Party is  a step  in the  right direction  that could
coalesce  with the Progressive Party to advocate transformative  democratic change.
150.  For a theoretical discussion of this point, see POWELL,  supra note  146, at 198.
151.  Therefore,  this coordination  should  also appeal  to  Democrats  as long  as  these  locally-
grounded, grassroots  organizations could reasonably  threaten to run viable candidates in a number
of  constituencies.  Attracting  some  black  incumbents  to  the  party  at  the  local  level  would
immediately  lend  credibility  to  this  threat.  On  the  other  hand,  as  Professor  Heather  Gerken
reminded  me,  third-party  candidates  would  in  fact  sometimes  result  in  Democratic  losses.
Indeed,  for third parties to have any effect, the threat of defection must be  credible,  which means
that there  will be short-term  costs.
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In other words,  a third-party  might force the Democrats  to alter their
policies;  it  might  also  force  them  to become  advocates  for citizens  to
exercise their political clout.  On the other hand, incumbents  of all races
generally  have  a vested  interest  in  the  hierarchical  status  quo.  Many
black incumbents  have  had  to  work  hard  to  curry  favor  with  wealthy
(black and  white) constituents and businesses in order to accumulate  the
war  chests  necessary  to  run  for  office;  as  a  result,  they  have  an
important disincentive to joining a new grassroots political organization.
Thus, a scenario that seeks  to disrupt hierarchy or at least to minimize it
may  need to be  accompanied  by  more dramatic  structural changes that
elevate the role  of political  issues  and political  engagement rather than
rely  solely  on  the  sympathies  of  political  candidates.  It  is  to  these
structural changes that I now turn.
B.  Proportional  Representation
Some might  say that  225  years  after  the American  Revolution,  it is
time  for  the  United  States  to  consider  the  advantages  of  democratic
models  that  do  not  stem  from  the  legacy  of British  rule.  A  second
thought  experiment  is  to  imagine  that  a  pro-democracy  movement
generates  activity  around  the  issue  of structural  reform,  including  the
adoption,  via  referenda  or  initiative,  of  proportional  representation
("PR") systems starting at the local level and then expanding  statewide.
As more people become  aware of the "sclerotic"  effects on voter choice
from incumbent-driven  gerrymandering  of election  districts,  reformers
may be  able to generate renewed  interest in PR, which  allows voters to
"district themselves" by the way they cast their ballots. 152
The most  common  type  of  PR  is  the  party  list system.  The  basic
principle  behind  party  list  systems  is  that  each  party  offers  a  list  of
152.  Incumbent  politicians  are  increasingly  able  to  use  districting  to  make  elections  less
competitive.  Drawing  district lines  to  create  safe  seats  for incumbents  of both  major  parties
suppresses  voter turnout  and saps democratic  choice.  See supra notes 86-93 and  accompanying
text (discussing  the  effects  of political  redistricting  and  the  Court's  application  of heightened
scrutiny).  As  the  2002  House  of  Representative  elections  demonstrate,  the  two  parties  often
cooperate  to manipulate electoral  outcomes.  In 2002,  seventy-eight  of the House races  had only
one major party candidate;  only four incumbents lost to non-incumbent  challengers.  Email  from
Rob  Richie,  Center for Voting  and Democracy to Lani  Guinier (Nov.  18,  2002,  13:35:50  EST).
Similarly, Robin Toner writes in the New York Times soon after the election:
[Tlhis year, redistricting became,  in many  states, an exercise  in protecting incumbents.
As  a result, [independent  analyst]  Charles Cook listed just 45 races-out  of 435  in the
House-as  competitive  in  October;  at the  same  time  10  years  ago,  there  were  151
competitive  races.  Only  25  incumbents  won  with  less  than  55  percent  of the  vote,
according  to another independent analyst, Rhodes Cook.
Robin Toner, In the House at Least, Moderation  is No Virtue, N.Y. TIMES,  Nov.  17, 2002,  § 4, at
3, available  at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
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candidates in each constituency.  Seats are then awarded to each party in
proportion  to  its  support  in  the  constituency,  and  individuals  fill  the
available  seats  based  on  their  position  on  the  list-for example,  if  a
party  wins  30%  of the  vote  and  earns  three  of ten  city  council  seats,
only  the top  three  persons  on  that  party's  list  will  gain  places  in  the
council.  How  the  order  of the  list  is  determined  is just  one  of  the
several important variations possible in party list systems. 1 53
Because list systems tend to use districts with large numbers of seats,
they  are  generally  the  best  arrangements  to  ensure  proportionality
between  votes  cast  for,  and  legislative  seats  won  by,  political  parties.
By placing emphasis  on parties  rather than  individual candidates,  party
list  systems  also  promote  campaigns  based  on  issues  and  platforms.
This  focus helps  to ensure  that  the  substantive  needs  of more citizens
are addressed  in  the political  arena.  Party  list systems  also  encourage
grassroots  social  movements  to  spawn  electorally-oriented  political
parties,  because  such  parties  need  capture  a  far  smaller  share  of  the
electorate  than  their counterparts  in  a winner-take-all  system to  win a
council or school board seat.  Moreover, PR promotes greater grassroots
mobilization within  the confines of the major political parties.  Because
PR  encourages  parties  to  emphasize  policies  rather  than  candidates,
different  constituencies  have  a  strong  incentive  to  organize  their
supporters  in  order  to  influence  the  party  platform  on  the  issues  that
matter  most  to  them.  The  order  of  names  on  party  lists  is  an  issue
around  which  constituencies  can  mobilize  and  negotiate  without
resulting  in  all-or-nothing  victories  of one  faction  or another  as  occurs
in  political  systems  in  which  each  party  runs  just  one  candidate  per
contest.  As  a  result, women  and  racial  minorities  often  fare  better  in
party list systems. 1 54
Cross-national  comparisons  of  West  European  nations  reveal  that
roughly  twice  as  many  women  are  elected  to  parliament  in  countries
that  use party  list systems. 155  Similarly,  the use of party list systems in
153.  The major variations among party  list systems  are:  (1) the formula used to award  seats at
the  constituency  level;  (2)  whether  there  is  a  formula  to  correct  any  imbalances  in  the
proportionality  of  representation  from  the  constituency  level;  (3)  whether  lists  are  closed,
meaning  their  order  is  determined  entirely  by  the  party,  or  open,  allowing  voters  to  influence
which candidates,  not just which parties,  gain representation;  and (4) the existence  and level  of a
minimum threshold for legislative representation.  GALLAGHER ET AL.,  supra  note  101,  at 309.
154.  DOUGLAS  J.  AMY,  BEHIND THE BALLOT Box: A  CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO VOTING  SYSTEMS
88-89 (2000)  [hereinafter  AMY,  BEHIND  THE BALLOT BOX]; IDEA  HANDBOOK,  supra note  106,
at 62-63.
155.  GALLAGHER  ET  AL.,  supra  note  101,  at 322.  Not only do  the  countries  with party  list
systems  vastly  outperform  the  single-member district  systems  used  by  Britain  and France,  they
also  fare  vastly  better  than  Ireland  and  Malta,  the  two  countries  that  currently  use  Single-
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democracies  with  deep  racial  divisions  like  South  Africa  and Namibia
has  resulted  in  impressively  diverse  national  legislatures,  even  when
race  continues  to  shape  voting  preferences  and  party  affiliation. 156
However,  PR  is  considered  a  radical  alternative  here  in  the  United
States,  even  though  most  western  democracies,  other  than  former
colonies of Great Britain, use some form of it and, in a modified form, it
was used for  100 years in Illinois.  Among  the most common criticisms
of party list systems  in particular,  and PR  in general,  are that their high
level  of proportionality  results  in  an  excessive  number  of parties  and
thus  legislative  gridlock.  These  concerns  reflect  our  preference  for
election  systems  that  promote  stability  and  measured  change  over
robust,  participatory  forms  of  democracy.  Critics  depend  upon
supposedly  paradigmatic  cases,  which conclusively  illustrate  the havoc
that PR can wreak on political systems.  Some students of both present-
day  Israel  and  Weimar  Germany  have  suggested  that  the  type  of  PR
used in these  two  states fostered  an excessive  number  of parties that in
turn  promoted  high  levels  of government  instability  and  paralysis,  and
ultimately-at  least  in  the  case  of  interwar  Germany--devastating
consequences.  However, a deeper analysis  of the two cases  challenges
the idea that they offer a general indictment against all electoral systems
based on proportional representation.
Israel  and  Weimar  Germany  both  conducted  elections  using
particular  variants  of  PR  that  allow  a  great  number  of parties  to  be
represented  in the national legislature.  The type of PR used in Weimar
Germany  promoted  the  multiplication  of  political  parties  because  as
long  as  a  party  won  at  least  30,000  votes  in  one  of the  thirty-five
constituencies,  it  could  count  on  roughly  proportional  representation
in  the  Reichstag. 157   What  the  critics  really  objected  to  was  the
combination of PR with a tiny entry threshold that permitted very  small
transferable  voting ("STV"), a more candidate-centered  form of PR, to elect their parliaments.  Id.
It is,  however,  worth noting  that  in  Australia, women  fare  far  better  in elections  to the  Senate,
which  use  STV,  than  they do in  contests  for the  House of Representatives,  which  are  based  on
single-member  districts.  AMY,  BEHIND  THE BALLOT Box, supra note  154, at  107; see also infra
note  165  (discussing STV).
156.  IDEA HANDBOOK,  supra  note  106,  at 62-63,  70.
157.  E.J.  FEUCHTWANGER,  FROM  WEIMAR TO  HITLER:  GERMANY,  1918-1933,  at 42  (1993).
That  the  multiplication  of  political  parties  corresponded  to  interwar  Germany's  bitter
sociopolitical  cleavages  was in part  a function of  the very  small  threshold  for representation  of
each  party.  Post-war Italy  is  another  country  that  opponents  of PR often  cite as a paradigmatic
case  of the havoc  wreaked by  the multiplication  of small  parties  PR supposedly promotes.  Like
Weimar  Germany  and Israel, for most of the  post-war period,  Italy used  a system  of PR  with an
extremely low threshold  of exclusion.
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parties  to enjoy  disproportionate power. 158  However,  our winner-take-
all  system  might  have  made  matters'even  worse.  In  1933,  in  the  last
"free"  election  of interwar  Germany,  the Nazis  were  by far the  largest
party  with  44%  of  the  vote,  yet  they  only  won  288  of  the  647
parliamentary  seats.  "Goering  said at  his  trial  that under  the  British
[winner-take-all]  system that election  would have given  the Nazis every
seat in the country,  and he cannot have been far wrong."'159
In  Israel,  the  entire  country  serves  as  one  district  to  elect  120
members  of  parliament,  and  the  threshold  of  exclusion  is  a  mere
1.5%.160  Simply instituting  a 5%  threshold  of exclusion would  reduce
the number  of parties  in the  2002 legislature  from  fifteen to  seven. 161
Israel  also  presents  a  problematic  case  for comparison  because  it is a
religious  rather  than  a  secular  democracy,  which  increases  and
intensifies  the  social  cleavages  that underlie  Israeli politics. 162  On  the
other hand,  PR does allow the  number of political parties in the Israeli
parliament  to  be  more  fully  representative  of  the  range  of  opinions
within  the  country.  In  an  ironic,  but  revealing,  paradox,  Palestinians
rate  Israeli  democracy  higher  than  American  winner-take-all
democracy.  "The  reason,"  says  Jon  B.  Alterman,  an  analyst  at  the
United  States  Institute  of Peace,  "is  that they see American democracy
as  beholden to interest groups, whereas  Israeli democracy  reflects  what
the Israeli people want." 163
158.  Such  a  5%  threshold  would  have  been enough  to keep the  Nazis out of the Reichstag  as
late as the elections of  1928.  While a winner-take-all  system would have achieved a similar result
in  1928,  it  would  have  probably  grossly  over-represented the  Nazis  in  the  national  legislature
beginning  in  1930, when,  with  18.3%  of the national  vote,  the  Nazis became the  second largest
party.  Id. at 42, 326.
159.  ENID  LAKEMAN,  POWER  TO  ELECT:  THE  CASE FOR  PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION
68 (1982).  Among  other  obstacles, the  anti-Nazi  parties  faced  press  censorship,  prohibition  of
meetings,  and  police  intimidation  and  violence  during  this  "free"  election.  FEUCHTWANGER,
supra note  157,  at 313-14.
160.  Giovanni  Sartori,  The  Party-Effects of Electoral Systems,  in  PARTIES,  ELECTIONS  AND
CLEAVAGES:  ISRAEL  IN COMPARATIVE  AND  THEORETICAL  PERSPECTIVE  13,  27  (Reuven  Y.
Hazan  & Moshe Maor eds.,  2000).  Before  1992,  the threshold of exclusion was  1%.  Id.
161.  This data is based on a table provided by Reuven Y. Hazan and Moshe Maor.  Id. at 6.
162.  Id.  at  26.  On  a  7.0  point-scale  designed  by  Arend  Lijphart,  Peter  J.  Bowman,  and
Reuven  Y. Hazan  to  measure  the  number and  intensity  of sociopolitical  cleavages  in  thirty-six
democracies  since World  War  II,  Israel  now  scores  a  5.0.  "This  is a remarkably  high number
compared  with..,  the other 35 democratic party  systems in the  1945-1996 period,  the highest of
which  is 3.5  and found  in only one country (Finland)."  By contrast,  the United States receives a
score  of  1.0.  Arend  Lijphart et al.,  Party Systems and Issue Dimensions: Israel  and Thirty-Five
Other Old and New Democracies Compared, in PARTIES,  ELECTIONS  AND CLEAVAGES:  ISRAEL
IN  COMPARATIVE  AND THEORETICAL  PERSPECTIVE  29,  33-37, 48  (Reuven  Y. Hazan  &  Moshe
Maor eds., 2000).
163.  Elaine  Sciolino,  Who Hates the U.S.?  Who Loves it?, N.Y. TIMES,  Sept. 23,  2001,  § 4, at
1, available at LEXIS,  News  Library,  The New York Times  File (quoting  Jon B. Alterman who
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Critics  of  party  list  systems  also  contend  that  they  do  not  nourish
close  ties between constituents  and their representatives  based on easily
observed  geographic  proximity  or identity.164  However,  there  exists  a
representational  system that combines the numerous advantages  of party
list  systems  while  simultaneously  promoting  strong  geographic  ties
between  constituents  and  their  representatives:  it  is  called  mixed-
member  proportional  voting  ("MMP"). 165  Under  MMP,  voters  make
two  choices.  Their  first  vote  is used  to elect  individual  candidates  in
single-member  district plurality contests, just as  in most elections in the
United  States.  The  second  vote  is  for  a  party,  and  the  remaining
legislative  seats  (in general  roughly  one  half)  are  allocated  through  a
party  list  system  to  ensure  that  each  party  that  meets  the  system's
minimum  threshold  of  support  has  proportional  representation  in  the
legislature. 166   In  recent  years,  the  clear  advantages  of  MMP,  first
implemented  in  1949  by  West  Germany,  has  made  it  quite  popular
among  new democracies  and  states  considering  major electoral reform.
Even by the elevated standards of Western Europe, under MMP postwar
Germany  has  witnessed  high turnout, 167  high  levels  of proportionality
between votes cast and candidates elected,  and large numbers of women
in parliament. 168  Germany's 5% threshold of exclusion has also helped
prevent  a multiplicity  of tiny  parties,  and  the government  has  enjoyed
stability without gridlock. 
169
has  written  extensively  on  the flow  of information  in  the  Arab  world.  "Whenever  there  is  a
survey of Palestinians, they always rate Israeli democracy higher than American democracy.").
164.  AMY,  BEHIND  THE BALLOT BOX, supra note  154, at 31.
165.  Single-transferable  voting  ("STV")  is  another  form  of  PR  that  does  maintain  close
constituent-representative  ties.  However,  it remains  a candidate-centered  system.  Therefore,  in
my  view, STV  is less desirable  than  PR systems based on party  lists.  Still, we should  remember
Douglas  Amy's  admonition  that  "[tihe  primary  danger  facing  the  PR  movement  is  not that  it
might  opt for the  'wrong'  version, but that it could  waste  valuable  time and energy  squabbling
over which system is best."  AMY,  REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES, supra note 88,  at 233.
166.  AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT Box, supra note  154, at 90.
167.  In its most recent parliamentary elections in September  2002, a full 79.1%  of the German
electorate  turned  out to vote,  despite  poor weather  in  much  of the  country.  And this impressive
participation  rate was actually down slightly  since  the  1998 elections,  when  turnout  was 82.2%.
Steven  Erlanger,  Germany's Leader Retains His Power After Tight Vote,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Sept.  23,
2002,  at Al,  available at LEXIS,  News  Library,  The  New  York  Times  File.  This  article  also
provides a helpful overview of Germany's electoral system  for interested readers.
168.  GALLAGHER  ET.  AL.,  supra note  101,  at 260, 322.  Not surprisingly,  German women  are
three times  more likely to win seats through party lists than through single-member  districts.  This
pattern holds in New  Zealand and Italy, which recently  adopted electoral  systems that include  the
use  of  both  party  lists  and  single-member  plurality  districts.  ROB  RICHIE  &  STEVEN  HILL,
REFLECTING Us ALL: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION  16-17  (1999).
169.  RICHIE & HILL, supra note  168, at 30.
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C.  Moving Toward the Twenty-First Century
The creation of locally-based  but politically-networked  third or fourth
parties  and  the  use  of proportional  representation  are  both  important
sites for engagement  and reform.  However,  they cannot by themselves
guarantee  the type of grassroots  organization  I have argued  is crucial to
re-invigorating  American  democracy.  For instance,  women and  people
of color  who  gain  office  under  PR  can  still  be  token  representatives
without  substantive  policy-making  influence.  Facilitating  the electoral
success of parties with progressive public policy agendas is a good thing
in  my  view,  but  the  crucial  connections  between  the  voters  and  the
decision-making  process  may  lapse  without  ongoing  opportunities  for
citizen  participation.  Therefore,  it  is  helpful  to  imagine  the  role  that
local  and  interactive  grassroots  experiments  can  play  in  promoting
broad-based  democratic  participation  independent  of  the  political
structure or party system  in place.
Perhaps  the most unlikely  examples  of alternative  forms of popular
engagement  come  from  Brazil. 170   The  work  of  a Brazilian  dramatist
illustrates that it is  possible to provide  all citizens  not just with a voice
to be heard, but also with a real  role to play in the democratic decisions
that  are  most  important  to  them.  When  his  theater  company  lost  its
funding,  Augusto  Boal  moved  to  dismantle  it  in  style.  He  wanted  to
showcase  his  troupe  in  the  event that  attracted  large  numbers  of local
residents-the  annual  Carnival.  To  secure  a  place,  he  had  to  find  a
political party that would share  its  space with him.  One party agreed  to
give  him space  if one  of his  members  ran  for  office  on  the  party  list.
Boal  agreed  and  ran  on  the  platform,  "Vote  for  me,  And  Elect  My
Theater Company."'171  He won  two terms as a city councilman.  Rather
than  hiring  legislative  aides,  he  hired  members  of  the  company  to
organize  his  constituents  into  issue-oriented  groups.  These groups
worked  through local  public policy concerns  using techniques  of forum
theater  and  role-plays.  Each  of the  seventeen  constituent  groups  then
170.  See generally  AUGUSTO  BOAL, LEGISLATIVE  THEATRE:  USING PERFORMANCE  TO MAKE
POLITICS  (1998).  Boal  describes  his  actual experiences  running  as  Vereador  in  Rio de  Janeiro,
Brazil, and  getting elected for two  terms.  During  that period  he introduced  successfully thirteen
laws that were  drafted  by constituency groups using Forum Theater exercises that helped citizens
"[d]evelop  their  taste  for political discussion (democracy)  and their desire to  develop their own
artistic  abilities (popular  art)."  Id. at  9.  Boal hired members  of his  theater group  to  function  as
"jokers"  or wild cards  who facilitated the development of seventeen  constituency groups,  each of
whom  worked through  the improvisation of possible  solutions to locally generated problems.  Id.
at  46.  Those solutions  were then converted into bills and introduced into the legislature by Boal.
Id. at 94.
171.  Id. at  15  ("For the first time in the history of the theatre  and the history of politics, there
opened up the possibility of a whole theatre company being elected to parliament.").
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enacted  an  improvisational  play  at  a theater  festival  that  demonstrated
their  view  of important  problems  they  faced  and  presented  possible
solutions.  The  productions  were  critiqued  and  revised  based  on
audience  feedback.  Several  of  the  proposals  were  then  drafted  into
bills,  which  Boal  introduced.  Some  became  law.  Nevertheless,  Boal
played  his  formal  role  with  a  more  transitive  understanding  of  the
representational  relationship between him and his constituents;  he never
once introduced a bill of his own. 172
The work of Augusto Boal is novel, and it moves us to the beginnings
of  an alternative  vision  of democracy-one  that  does  not fetishize  the
role of a meritorious or otherwise deserving representative  but views the
representative  as  one  member  of  an  interactive  community.  It  is  a
radically  unfamiliar vision to most Americans,  yet it is grounded in the
same  despair  that  millions  of Americans  experienced  after  the  2000
election.  Boal  asked  a  simple  question  of  the  other  supporters  of  a
Brazilian  presidential  candidate  who  won  thirty-one  million  votes  and
lost by a  narrow  margin: "We  Are  31  Million:  Now What?"'173  Rather
than  simply  relying  on  technical  solutions  to  fix  the  winner-take-all
character  of Brazil's presidential  elections,  Boal turned  to a local form
of citizen engagement. 174  His experiments  in what he calls  "legislative
theater"  illustrate  the  dual  power  of  organizing  local  residents.  He
invited their participation in ways that continued even after his election.
He  also  facilitated  opportunities  for  his  constituents  to  generate
innovative solutions to longstanding public policy dilemmas.
IV. RESPONSE TO CRITICISM OF THIS ESSAY
Thus  far,  I  have  attempted  to  identify  the anti-democratic  strains  in
our political  system using  some thought  experiments  to help us reflect
on these  structural  problems.  In the last  section of this Essay, I  would
like to explain  why I believe in participatory  democracy  and embrace  it
not as  a tactic  to  achieve  particular  substantive  ends, but  as  an  end  in
itself.  In  a country  with  such  a longstanding  rhetorical  and  symbolic
commitment  to democracy,  it may  seem  intuitive  that more democracy
(however defined) is a good thing.
172.  Id. at  105.
173.  Jan  Cohen-Cruz,  Theatricalizing Politics, in  PLAYING  BOAL:  THEATRE,  THERAPY,
AcTIVISM 227, 233  (Mady Schutzman  & Jan Cohen-Cruz eds.,  1994).
174.  Although Boal's experience  may seem improbable  by  United States standards,  there  are
many local examples  of similar efforts.  See GUINIER  & TORRES, supra note  80, at ch. 6; see also
Tamar Lewin,  One State Finds Secret to Strong Civic Bonds, N.Y. TIMES,  Aug. 26,  2001,  §  1, at
1,  available at LEXIS,  News  Library,  The New York  Times  File  (describing  the  unlikely  roles
that people without  a high school  education  play in local government  in New Hampshire).
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However, Professor Louis Michael Seidman has offered an important
critique  of democratic  process  that  deserves  a  response. 175  Professor
Seidman  begins his analysis by pointing out the tremendous inequalities
in income and wealth that continue to grow in our country-inequalities
that  have  resulted  in  high  levels  of  poverty  and  over  one  in  ten
American  households  not  having  enough  food  to  eat.176   Professor
Seidman  suggests  that  "the  American  people  would  not  casually  and
unthinkingly  accept  this  obscenity  unless  there  were  complex  and
powerful  legitimating  structures  in  place  allowing  them  to  distance
themselves  from  it."'177  He  then  describes  four  such  legitimating
structures.  The  first,  which  operates  at  a  mass  level,  is  a  belief that
America  is  a  meritocracy  where  "people  get  more  or less  what  they
deserve."' 178   Related  to  this  mass  belief  in  meritocracy  are  two
additional  legitimating  structures  that  operate  on  elites:  (2)  a belief  in
economic efficiency  as requiring as little redistribution  and regulation as
possible  in  order  to  maximize  the  total  pie,  and  (3)  a  belief  in  the
rhetoric  of  impotence-that  resource  maldistribution  results  from
complex phenomena over which we have  little control, and "[e]fforts  to
deal  with  it  are  bound  to  have  unintended  and  counterproductive
consequences."' 179   The  fourth  legitimating  structure,  according  to
Professor  Seidman,  is  democracy  itself:  "the  claim  is that  the current
distribution of power and wealth  is justified because it is produced by a
political process that is open to all."'18 0  This is the most powerful  of the
four,  in  part  because  it  operates  on  both  elites  and  the  general
population. 18'
Let  me  begin  by  pointing  out  that  I  agree  with  much  of  Professor
Seidman's analysis.  I agree that our country's (racially-correlated)  level
of poverty  is dangerous  and destabilizing.  As earlier parts of this Essay
make  clear,  I  agree  that  we  must  de-construct  the  meritocracy  and
demonstrate  how  it  operates  to  perpetuate  the  maldistribution  of
opportunities.  I also  agree with  Professor Seidman's  insightful critique
that ideas  of economic efficiency  and the  rhetoric  of impotence  trump
and cabin efforts to redistribute resources.
182
175.  See  Louis  Michael  Seidman,  Democracy and Legitimation: A  Response  to Professor
Guinier,  34 LOY.  U. CHI.  L.J. 77  (2002).
176.  Id. at 77.
177.  Id. at 77-78.
178.  Id. at 78.
179.  Id. at 78-79.
180.  Id. at 79.
181.  Id.
182.  Id.
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Where  we  disagree,  of  course,  is  about  my  belief  in  democracy.
Professor Seidman's  main point  is  that without  a substantive  vision  of
social  justice,  an  emphasis  on  democracy  is  unlikely  to  combat  the
socioeconomic  deprivation endured by tens of millions of Americans. 183
I  do not  quarrel  with  this claim  and  yet I  do not  believe,  as  Professor
Seidman  apparently  does,  that  democratic  practice  and  substantive
justice are unrelated,  even mutually  exclusive.184
The key differences, perhaps, between Professor Seidman and myself
are  that  Professor  Seidman  equates  democracy  with  voting,  assumes
that  conservative  majorities  will  out-vote  progressive  minorities,
measures  principled  political  legitimacy  in  winner-take-all  terms,  and
isolates  organizing  techniques  as  distinct  from  democratic  practice.
185
He  perceives  a  zero-sum trade-off  between  substantive  and procedural
justice  such  that  just  outcomes  require  "painful,  sometimes
unprincipled, compromise, postponing demands that cannot in justice be
postponed,  and  carefully  constructing  coalitions  with  partners  we
secretly'detest."
1 86
For  me,  democracy  and  substantive justice  are  dynamic,  contingent,
and  interdependent  variables.  Substantive  justice  is  rarely  sustainable
when  arbitrarily  imposed  by  fiat  or  achieved  by  "painful,  sometimes
unprincipled,  compromise"  that  unravels  over  time.  Nor  can
progressives  claim  victory  when  we  change  minds  without  achieving
structural reforms or achieve particular legislative or electoral  outcomes
simply through the process of counting votes.
Let  me  be  clear.  Voting  or counting  votes  does  not  a  democratic
practice  make.  Democratic  practices  are  those  that  value  power-
sharing,  invite  broad  participation,  engage  stakeholders  in  local
decision-making  about  concrete  problems,  and yield  creative  solutions
that  are nevertheless  subject to critical feedback.  By  providing people
with the organizational  tools they  need to overcome the deep, racialized
inequalities  that continue to persist in this country,  democratic practices
educate,  motivate,  and  transform. 187   As  Texas  organizer  Ernesto
Cortes  says:  "We've  got  to  get  past  the  dominant  ideology  that  says
we're  clients  and  consumers  and  that  politics  is  about  electronic
plebescites ....  We've  got  to develop  a  civic  culture  of conversation
183.  Id. at 77.
184.  According  to Professor  Seidman,  "no  amount  of tinkering  with forms  of democracy  is
likely to achieve social justice."  Id. at 83.
185.  Id. at 83-84.
186.  Id. at 87-88.
187.  FRANCESCA  POLLETrA,  FREEDOM  IS  AN  ENDLESS  MEETING:  DEMOCRACY  IN
AMERICAN  SOCIAL  MOVEMENTS  181,  200 (2002).  "Organizing  is teaching."  Id. at  181.
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and  house  meetings  and  public  actions  and  negotiations  and
reciprocity."'88
A  commitment to sharing power that invites continuous participation
by  the relevant  stakeholders  over time  is  compatible  with,  and indeed
foundational to,  a commitment to both democracy and  social justice.  It
is also the essence of good organizing.  Democratic practice sustains  the
kinds  of  vital  social  movements  that  energize  political  activism  and
social change.  Such  movements  may be  animated  by substantive  ideas
but  these  movements  are  most  successful  when  they  use  democratic
means  to realize their ends.  In the Southern civil  rights movement,  for
example:
[O]rganizers  used participatory  democracy  to school  local residents in
the practices  of politics, thus exploiting the  developmental  benefits of
the  form.  ...  [The  movement]  combined practical  organizing  with  a
vision  of radical  social  change,  sought  local  gains  while exposing  to
the  nation  the  injustices  of  Southern  apartheid,  and  treated
participatory  decision-making  both  as  a  strategy  and  as  an  end  in
itself. 189
The relationship  between  social justice  and  participatory  democracy
is  being  explored  systematically  in  the  work  of  those,  sometimes
called  the  "new  governance"  critics,  and  elsewhere  referred  to  as
democratic experimentalists. 190  These academics  evaluate and compare
innovative  local  efforts  "to  mobilize  the  contextual  intelligence  that
only citizens  possess  through mechanisms  for community  participation
in  deliberation  about  problems,  in  developing  and  deciding  among
188.  Id. at  176.
189.  Id.  at  2,  199.  An  exclusive  preoccupation  with  substantive  justice  misses  this  core
democratic  claim,  which  is  rooted  in  ideas of dignity,  self-respect,  voice,  and  the  desire  to  be
heard.  A  focus only  on the substantive  outcomes  also ignores  the way  the distribution  of power
helped  create  the substantive problem in the first place.  If the problem  is there because of power
inequality,  then  the  problem  cannot  be  fixed  without  acknowledging  and  addressing  that
inequality.  There  are  no  short  cuts  around  the  fundamental  challenge  that unequal  access  to
power  presents.  Of course  democratic  practice  often  falls  short  of effectively  redressing  these
inequities;  yet,  the  very  relevance  of such  efforts  reflects  the  substantive  and  moral content  of
democratic  commitments.  I am indebted to Sociologist Marshall Ganz  for this formulation.
190.  Jennifer  Gordon,  New  Governance  Models,  New  Roles  for  Rights:  Lessons  from  the
Underground  Economy  4,  43  (Nov.  4,  2002)  (unpublished  typescript,  on  file  with author);  see
also Michael  Dorf & Charles  Sabel,  A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM.
L.  REv. 267  (1998)  (discussing  a new form of governance  where power is decentralized, enabling
citizens  to  use  their  local  knowledge  to  find  innovative  solutions  to  their circumstances,  while
coordinating  bodies at the regional and national  level share this collective  knowledge  with others
facing similar situations).
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creative  solutions,  and  in implementing  those  decisions."1 91   Whether
the context  involves  issues  of the environment  or school  reform,  local
participants  are  called  on  "not  merely  to  express  an  opinion-or
demand  a solution-but to help formulate  and implement solutions."' 192
The  new  governance  scholars  conclude  that  the  fallibility  of  well-
intentioned  social  policy  requires  opportunities  for  grassroots
participation,  experimentation,  and benchmarking.
193
I,  for  one,  don't  necessarily  know  in  advance  what  the  most just
policy  outcome  is  in  all  situations  or how  to  achieve  it.  Part  of the
impulse  for my  belief in democracy  is that the people  themselves have
superior  wisdom  in  so  many  ways  to  those  of  us  who  have  superior
book  learning.  Thus,  my  argument  for  democracy  draws  on  the
interdisciplinary  new  governance scholarship,  as well  as the old school
tradition  of  organizing,  to  suggest  that  ordinary  people  should  be
empowered  to  play  an  active  role  in  public  policy  debates,  where
"people's  interests  may be  transformed  through  collective  reflection
and deliberation,"  and where they can develop and implement creative
strategies to address important issues in their lives. 
194
When  stakeholders  play  a  vital  role  in  deliberation  and  decision-
making, their involvement also helps sustain public policy  reforms long
term.  At minimum,  the inability  of civil  rights  advocates  to  transform
court  victories  in  the  1950s,  1960s,  and  1970s  into  genuine
advancement  of  social  justice  on-the-ground  should  make  us  wary  of
over-reliance  on litigation-based,  elite-dominated  strategies  to promote
substantive equality and  meaningful opportunity.  In The Hollow Hope,
Gerald Rosenberg  persuasively  argues  that  implementation  constraints
on  the  judiciary  meant  that  major  decisions  in  areas  including
191.  Gordon,  supra  note  190,  at  5  (citing  Charles  Sabel  et  al.,  Beyond  Backyard
Environmentalism,  at  http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR24.5/sabel.html  (Oct./Nov.  1999),  at  web
page  1).
192.  ld. at 4-5.
193.  The  term  "benchmarking"  refers  to  a form  of  learning  by  monitoring.  It  involves  the
disciplined  pooling  of  information  from  multiple  local  sources  with  the  twin  goals  of  (1)
establishing  expectations  of what  is possible  and (2)  ultimately bootstrapping  or scaling up local
innovations  into regional or national reforms that emulate and coordinate best practices.  See Dorf
&  Sabel,  supra note  190,  at  287ff;  see also Gordon,  supra note  190,  at  45  (citing,  inter alia,
Susan  Sturm's  analysis  of participatory  decision-making  in  the  workplace  and  Archon  Fung's
'street  level democracy'  in the context of school  reform and community policing).  "Rather  than
assigning  to government  the  sole  responsibility  for  establishing  and  enforcing  strict rights,  the
new governance model asks the state to facilitate and finance local experimentation with solutions
to  complex  problems,  and  then  to  evaluate  and  compare  the  outcomes  of  the  resulting
innovations."  Gordon, supra note  190,  at 4; see also GUINIER & TORRES,  supra note  80, at chs.
4--6.
194.  POLLETrA,  supra note  187,  at 200.
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de-segregation,  voting rights, housing, women's rights, and the criminal
justice  system  were  only  effective  when  other  important  political  and
community  actors  supported  those  decisions. 195  Rosenberg  points  out
that  civil  rights  advocates'  dependence  on  the  court  sapped  precious
resources  from  more  direct  action  forms  of advocacy-such  as  mass
demonstrations,  sit-ins,  boycotts,  and  freedom  rides-that  were
ultimately  more  effective  vehicles  for social  change. 196  Even  when  a
court decision  has the capacity  to foster far-reaching  change without the
support  of  other  political  actors,  the  failure  to  mobilize  rank-and-file
supporters  can  inhibit  effective  reform.  Consider  the  context  of
abortion,  where  Roe  v.  Wade 197  opened  the door for significant  social
change  by invalidating  laws  in forty-six  states  and  apparently  allowing
private  actors  to  implement  the  decision  without  other  political
support. 198  Rosenberg  demonstrates that, convinced  the fight was over,
abortion  rights  advocates  significantly  scaled  back their activities  after
Roe,  while  the  decision  simultaneously  mobilized  their  opponents.
199
As  a  result,  in  the  years  following  Roe,  pressure  from  anti-abortion
forces meant that few hospitals would provide abortions,  and to exercise
their  constitutional  right  to  an  abortion,  hundreds  of  thousands  of
women  had to travel  great distances  and/or face  significant  harassment
from protesters.
200
The failures  that  Rosenberg  documents  took place  in  a context of a
far more  liberal  federal judiciary,  where  advocates  were  at least able to
win  important  legal  victories  in  the  first  place.  With  many  federal
courts  now  dominated  by judges  with  a  very  conservative  perspective
on  the  substantive  fights  at  stake,  progressives  find  themselves
less  disappointed  by  implementation  failures  and  more  frustrated  by
implementation  efforts  in  the  other direction.2 0 1  Notwithstanding  this
shift in the ideology  of the federal judiciary,  the key  point is that elite-
based  strategies that focus exclusively or even primarily on using courts
195.  GERALD  N. ROSENBERG,  THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
196.  Id. at  133,  339.
197.  Roe  v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113  (1973).
198.  ROSENBERG,  supra note  195,  at 175,  195-96.
199.  Id. at  188, 339-40.
200.  Id. at 195-96.
201.  In  a recent  opinion  piece  for  the New  York  Times, Bob  Herbert  pointed out  that "[t]he
political  right has been relentless  in its campaign  to control the  federal courts, and that campaign
is  getting  awfully  close  to  an  absolute  victory.  Seven  of the  13  circuit  courts  are  already
controlled  by  Republican  appointees,  and  it  is  possible  that  within  two  years  [with  more
appointments  by  President  Bush]  that  control  will  extend  to  as  many  as  12,  and  maybe  all  13
circuits."  Bob  Herbert,  Editorial,  The  Right Judge?, N.Y.  TIMES,  Sept.  26,  2002,  at  A29,
available  at LEXIS,  News Library,  The New York Times File.
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to  achieve  social  change,  even  when  successful,  may  change  certain
rules temporarily, but do not go far enough to build broad-based support
for those changes  to assure their durability.
For  example,  gay  rights  activist Tom Stoddard  admonishes  lawyer-
activists  to  anchor  social  justice  reforms  in  "culture-shifting"  and  not
just "rule-shifting"  approaches. 20 2  Stoddard encourages  those who  seek
lasting change to "connect"  with  the public by  "thinking  as concertedly
about  process  as  we  do  about  substance." 2 0 3   Sociologist  Francesca
Polletta  also  concludes  that  broad-based  participation  can  enable  and
sustain  a substantive  vision.  Democratic  decision-making,  she  reports,
helps social movements  "build solidarity,  innovate tactically,  secure  the
leverage  of  political  opinion  and  develop  enduring  mechanisms  of
political accountability. '204
Polletta's  conclusion  that  democratic  practices  help  secure
accountability  and  leverage  public  opinion  is based  on  her pioneering
study of seven social  movements.  Similarly, Stoddard's admonition  "to
connect"  with  the  public  and  to  pay  attention  to  process  as  well  as
substance  resonates  with  a  few  key  lessons  from  history.  After  the
unanimous  Supreme  Court  ruling against constitutionalizing  women's
right to vote  in Minor v.  Happersett, 2 0 5 suffragists  launched a  massive
social  movement  that  ultimately  led  to the  passage  and  ratification  of
the  Nineteenth  Amendment.20 6   In  a  similar  vein,  Theda  Skocpol
explains that the role of grassroots  voluntary  associations was crucial  in
effecting  successful  social  policies  throughout  United  States  history:
"[A]  close look reveals  how much the development of each policy owes
to  social  movements  and  voluntary  associations  that  promoted  and
shaped  it  in  partnership  with  elected  politicians  and  government
officials."
2 0 7
202.  Thomas  B.  Stoddard,  Bleeding  Heart: Reflections on  Using the  Law to Make  Social
Change, 72  N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 974-77 (1997).
203.  Id. at 991.
204.  POLLETrA, supra note  187,  at viii.
205.  Minor v.  Happersett, 88  U.S. (21  Wall.)  162 (1874).
206.  KEYSSAR, supra note  10, at 197-218.
207.  THEDA  SKOCPOL,  THE  MISSING  MIDDLE  32  (2000).  Skocpol  identifies  nineteenth
century  public education,  Civil War  benefits, programs to help mothers  and children in  the 1910s
and  1920s, the  Social  Security Act, and the G.I.  Bill,  as among  the country's  finest  social policy
achievements.  She suggests  that each  of these  systems of social  support  had the following  key
features  in common:  (1)  the perception  that the program was a return to individuals for  service to
the community or a preparation  for service;  (2)  the support of broad cross-class  coalitions;  (3)  the
support  of  grassroots  voluntary  organizations;  and  (4)  the  availability  of public  revenues  to
support the program.  Id. at 25-43.
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Indeed,  until we develop political solutions that educate and motivate
people  to  assume  greater  moral  and  political  agency,  I  am  quite
skeptical  that we will  come  up with  something  that  can fundamentally
alter  the  status  quo.  How  do  you  motivate  people  to  do  something
about  their situation?  You give them  hope.  You give  people  a feeling
that  they  have  power  to  make  a  difference.  But,  you  can't  empower
people  in  this  way  if you  tell  them,  "I  already  have  the  solution.  I
already know  what you need.  As long as you go  along with me,  things
will be better."
One great example  of this is the contrasting  experiences of the AFL-
CIO  and  the  United  Farm  Workers  ("UFW")  in  organizing  farm
workers in the  1960s  and  1970s.  Both organizing efforts were designed
to  redistribute  resources  to  protect the  interests  of  those  doing  back-
breaking  work in  the California fields.  The AFL-CIO  used a top-down
strategy,  primarily  targeting  itinerant  white  men,  for  short-term
organizing  drives  designed  to  influence  sympathetic  policy-makers.
The  AFL-CIO  had  little  success  and  essentially  withdrew  from  its
organizing efforts.  By contrast, the UFW came up with a very different
strategy designed to mobilize the Mexican and Mexican-American  farm
workers  who  constituted  an  increasing  segment  of  the  labor  force.
Drawing  upon  national,  religious  and political  symbols  and  practices,
the  UFW  helped  these  farm  workers  gain  a  sense  of  dignity
that  mobilized  them  into  action.  At  regular  union  board  or planning
meetings,  processes  of  internal  deliberation  and  the  mechanisms  of
organizational  accountability allowed farm workers  to play  a major role
in  identifying  goals  and  formulating  strategies  to accomplish  them.  It
was  their  power  in  coming  together  and  working  through  sustained,
grassroots  collective  action  that  led  to  the  well-known  grape  boycott
and  ultimately  raised  the  level  of working  conditions  for  these  farm
workers.
Thus,  when  I am  talking  about  democracy,  I  am really  talking about
enabling  all the relevant  stakeholders  to participate  in  decision-making
processes  that shape their lives.  And, of course, we cannot achieve this
simply by  fixing  antiquated  voting  machines.  Although  we  should all
be  troubled  when  the outcome  of a  presidential  election  hinges  on the
disproportionate  exclusion  of  black,  working-class,  and  poor  voters,
new voting machines  will not transform American  democracy along the
lines  I  am  proposing.  After  all,  voting  is  a  mechanical  approach  to
political  participation;  universal  suffrage  is necessary  but not sufficient
for democracy.  Nor is proportional representation  itself a panacea.  But,
as  explained  above,  PR  does  tend  to  foster  a  much  more  engaged
democratic  citizenry.  A  well-organized  progressive  third  party  could
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have  a similar effect.  And,  probably  most important  of all, innovative
strategies  that  draw  upon  the  dynamic  energy  and  problem-solving
capacities  of poor people  and  communities  of color-such  as  Augusto
Boal's theatre  of the  oppressed  and  the  UFW  organizing  campaign-
could transform our political system to empower stakeholders.
Also  note  that  this  vision  of democracy  will,  I  hope,  result  in  the
substantive  social  justice  that  Professor  Seidman  and  I  both  worry
about.  This is not because I am disingenuously proposing democracy  as
a proxy  for social justice; rather, it is because  my  vision of democracy
allows  people  to  play  a  major  role  in  confronting  the  problems  they
face.  The  UFW  improved  living  standards  for  poor  Latino  farm
workers by involving the farm workers  themselves  in creating strategies
for change.  And this is the point behind the various democratic  reforms
I  propose:  cultivating  a more  politically  engaged  populace  who  would
have  the  opportunity  to participate  in democratic  processes  that  affect
their lives.
The  preceding  discussion  not only  responds  to  Professor  Seidman's
principal  critique  that I privilege procedure  over substance;  I  believe it
addresses  his  four  more  specific  objections  to  my  emphasis  on
democracy  as  well.208  First,  Professor  Seidman  suggests  democracy
ignores  other  legitimating  structures.209   In  reality,  democracy
illuminates other  legitimating  structures.  Consider  the  Texas  Ten
Percent  Plan,  where  the  Hopwood  v.  Texas
2 10  decision,  ending
affirmative  action,  mobilized a coalition of black and Latino activists  to
respond  to  the  illusions  of  the  meritocracy  more  directly.  These
activists  ultimately  developed  new  admissions  criteria  for  Texas's
flagship  universities  that opened  up  opportunities  for  students  of color
as well  as poor whites, and in so doing, they forged new coalitions with
conservative rural legislators.
Professor Seidman also  suggests  that emphasizing  democratic  theory
comes  at  the  expense  of  fighting  poverty,  homelessness,  and  other
forms  of  deprivation. 211   In  fact,  as  the  experience  of  the  UFW
demonstrates,  it is  the  practice  of democracy  that  facilitates  the  fight
against these problems by tapping  the creative  capacities of those most
affected.  Of course, Professor Seidman is correct that the farm workers
mobilized around substantive  issues that affected their lives.212  But the
208.  Seidman, supra note  175, at 78-79.
209.  Id.
210.  Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533  U.S. 929 (2001).
211.  Seidman, supra note  175,  at 80, 83.
212.  Id. at 83.
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key point is that the UFW was  able to diagnose the problems  facing  the
farm workers and develop effective  solutions because its model-unlike
that  of  the  AFL-CIO-was  more  democratic  to  the  extent  that  it
cultivated the participation of the relevant stakeholders.
213
Third, Professor  Seidman argues  that democratic  engagement  is just
not possible without a minimal level of subsistence. 214  And, this is  true
to  a  great  extent.  It  is  part  of  why  Election  Day  should  become  a
national holiday  and why  reducing the role of money  in politics  is vital.
It also  reveals  why  democracy  is  more  than  voting  and  certainly  more
than  holding  periodic  elections  in  which  fewer  and  fewer people  vote.
Genuine democracy  is about  organizing  relationships  so that all  people
have  the  power  to play  an  active  role  in  community  decision-making,
and this  active  role is  only  possible when people  have a  minimal  level
of subsistence  and when  the values of community prompt us to provide
for  the  collective  "we"  and  not just  for  the  individual  "me."  But the
experience  of the  UFW  demonstrates  that  democratic  practices,  which
promote  internal  deliberation  and  organizational  accountability,  can
encourage  robust participation  even among  very  poor  people,  who are
emboldened  to  define  and  pursue  their  collective  concerns  despite
limited  resources.  By rehearsing  forms  of resistance,  participants  gain
the  confidence  and  the  desire  to  speak  out  in  more  public  settings.
Similarly,  Boal's  use  of  popular  theater  engaged  thousands  of
impoverished  Brazilians  who  did  not  have  the  time  or  resources  to
organize  a  political  action  committee,  but  who  could  contribute  to
solving  the  problems  that  affected  their  lives  when  given  the
opportunity.
A  final  criticism  that  Professor  Seidman  makes  is  that  I  am
unrealistically  optimistic and  that the reforms  I  advocate  are  not going
to  happen.215  It  is,  of course,  true  that  my  project  requires  faith  that
transformative  change  is  possible.  But  from  the  beginning,  all  social
movements,  including  the  civil  rights  movement,  have  required  such
faith.  And, while "the forces of retrogress"-as Dr. King called them-
have  defeated  many  initiatives  to  advance  equality  and  social justice,
civil  rights  advocates  have  also  won  amazing  victories  against
remarkable  odds.  To illustrate, I'd like to take just one example  that is
particularly apt in this context.
213.  Marshall  Ganz,  Resources  and Resourcefulness:  Strategic Capacity in the  Unionization
of California  Agriculture, 1959-1966, 105  AM. J. SOC.  1004  (Jan. 2000).
214.  Seidman,  supra note  175,  at 79-80.
215.  Id. at 86.
2002]Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
In December  1964, Dr. King and fellow civil rights advocate Andrew
Young  met  with  top  administration  officials,  including  President
Johnson  and Vice President Humphrey, to push for a Voting Rights Act
in  1965.216  Their pleas  fell on deaf ears.  The Vice President told them,
"We passed the civil rights bill only  a few months  ago.  It's too soon."
But black Americans  in Selma, Alabama, knew  it was anything but too
soon for a Voting Rights Act.  Selma is in majority-black Dallas County
where, in  1964, blacks were  almost entirely  disenfranchised  and whites
held  all  the  important  political  positions.  Certainly,  in  1964,  anyone
suggesting  that disenfranchised,  poor blacks in  Selma, Alabama,  would
change the  course  of American  history  would have  been  met  with  the
response:  "it's  not  going  to  happen."  And  yet  that  is  exactly  what
happened.
On  Sunday,  March  7,  1965,  an  unarmed  group  of  blacks,  which
included  children  and  senior  citizens,  quietly  marched  across  the
Edmund  Pettus  Bridge  in  Selma  en  route  to  the  state  capital,
Montgomery,  to assert their right to vote.  The idea for the march came
on  the  heels  of  Jimmie  Lee  Jackson's  murder  in  neighboring  Perry
County  two  weeks  earlier.  Jackson,  a  twenty-seven-year-old  black
pulpwood  cutter,  had  been  shot  in  the  stomach  by  state  troopers  on
February  18,  after  he  tried  to  protect  his  mother  from  the  clubs  of
troopers breaking  up a night voter registration vigil.  Jackson died a few
days  later.  At  his  funeral,  attorney  and  civil  rights  advocate  J.L.
Chestnut remembered  people  saying, "Goddamn  it,  we  ought to  carry
his  body  over  to  [then  Alabama  governor]  George  Wallace  in
Montgomery."  These  angry  sentiments  soon  evolved  into  a  plan  to
walk to Montgomery  to petition Wallace for the right to vote.
As  the  marchers  approached  the  bridge  on  March  7,  the  troopers
sounded  a  two-minute  warning.  Then,  without  more  than  a  few
seconds, they attacked.  A state trooper's club hit organizer Mrs. Amelia
Boynton on the back of the neck, and she fell to the ground.  While she
was regaining consciousness,  she heard someone  ordering her to get up
and  run  or  she  would  be  tear-gassed.  Former  United  States  Senator
Harris  Wofford,  who  came  to  Selma  to  join  a  subsequent  march,
described  Mrs.  Boynton's  eyewitness  account  of  what  came  to  be
known as "Bloody Sunday":
Then  the  tear  gas  can  was  dropped  next  to  her  head.  To  a
mounted  posse,  Sheriff  Clark  shouted,  'Get  those  goddamn
216.  This  account  of events  surrounding  the  march  from  Selma  to  Montgomery  and  the
passage  of the  Voting  Rights  Act  is  taken  from  LANI  GUINIER,  LIFT  EVERY  VOICE  169-82
(1998).
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niggers!  Get  those  goddamn  white  niggers!'  and  the  horsemen
charged  with  bullwhips.  'Deputies'  using  the  electric  cattle  prods,
chase[d]  the  marchers  still  on  their  feet  all  the  way  back  to
Brown's Chapel.
217
Films  of the event  resembled  a battle  scene,  with  bombs,  smoke,  and
mass  chaos.  There  was  widespread  public  concern  after  video  clips
were  shown  on  national  television,  interrupting  an  ABC  Sunday  night
special, Judgment at Nuremberg.
Within  five months, President Johnson signed  the Voting  Rights Act
of 1965, ensuring that black Americans had the right to vote for the first
time  since Reconstruction.  Johnson  later  admitted that they  passed the
1965  Voting  Rights  Act  on  a bridge  on  March  7,  1965,  heading  from
Selma to Montgomery.
218
V.  CONCLUSION
Consistent  with  the  original  terms  of our  democracy,  the debacle  in
Florida and  its unseemly  denouement at  the hands of our highest court
were surprisingly inevitable. They grew from the seeds planted early on
in our history  in  which  the capacity  of the  many  was compromised  to
protect the rights of the few. If we want to build a democracy upon a set
of  more  participatory  and  egalitarian  premises,  we  have  to  come  to
terms  with  the  legacy  of  slavery  as  it  has  shaped  our  fundamentally
unfair  current  political  structures.  But we  also  must  let go  of notions
that  a more  liberal or egalitarian  sounding elite can be trusted  with this
task.  The  idea  of  democracy  is  the  idea  that  the  people  shall  rule.
Draping  elitism  in  meritocratic  clothing  does  not  a  democracy  make.
This  is  not  about  changing  the  couture  of  democracy  to  a  more
pedestrian  soft  brown-toned  wardrobe.  This  is  about  embracing  a
fundamentally  participatory  role  for  the  people  themselves.  We  will
know  we  have  shifted  paradigms  when  the  grandsons  and  great
granddaughters  of former slaves  assume their rightful place, not just as
token  members  of  a  ruling  elite  but  as  respected  members  of  a
democratic polity where votes are counted, voices are heard, and people
are  encouraged  to  participate  even  after  the  election.  As  Henry
Wiencek writes in the New York  Times:
This  country  was  founded  upon  a bargain  for  which  we  continue  to
pay  the  price.  We  compound  the  mistake  by  draping  a  veil  of
innocence  over the transaction.  The true beneficiary of the presentism
217.  Id.
218.  Id.
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defense  is  not  the  past  but  the present-it  guards  and  preserves  our
fervent wish to have sprung from innocent origins.
219
Black  Americans  understand  this  all  too  well,  and  they  therefore  have
much to contribute to the re-invigoration of our democracy.
There  are  contrasting  approaches  to  democracy  that  have,  as  yet,
untapped  potential  to  create  something  egalitarian,  issue-oriented,  and
participatory  through  innovation  and  collaboration,  both  among  the
people  and  between  people  and their  representatives.  Not only is  this
presumably  the normative goal of democracy,  it is a model that has been
adapted to at least  some degree  by many  nations throughout the world.
It is not implausible  to imagine such alternative forms  finding their way
to our shores.  Such an outcome  depends  upon our coming  together to
create  a vibrant multi-party  democracy  that considers  the voices  of the
losers as well  as the winners,  and that builds toward a society  governed
by  a vigorous combination  of ideas  and engaged citizens  rather than an
entrenched  oligarchy  dependent  upon  pedigree,  paper  credentials,  or
money.
219.  Henry Wiencek,  Editorial,  Yale and the Price of Slavery, N.Y.  TIMES,  Aug.  18,  2001,  at
A15, available  at LEXIS,  News Library,  The New  York Times File.
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